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"HOW'S MY DRIVING?" FOR EVERYONE
(AND EVERYTHING?)
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ*
This is an Article about using reputation-tracking technologies to displace criminal
law enforcement and improve the tort system. The Article contains an extended
application of this idea to the regulation of motorist behavior and examines the
broader case for using technologies that aggregate dispersed information in various
settings where reputational concerns do not adequately deter uncooperative
behavior.
The Article proposes a compulsory "How's My Driving?" program for all motor
vehicles. Although more rigorous study is warranted, the initial data from volun-
tary "How's My Driving?" programs is quite promising, suggesting that the use of
"How's My Driving?" placards on commercial trucks is associated with fleet acci-
dent reductions ranging from 20% to 53%. By delegating traffic regulation to the
motorists themselves, the state might free up substantial law enforcement resources,
more effectively police dangerous and annoying forms of driver misconduct, reduce
information asymmetries in the insurance market, and alleviate road rage and
driver frustration.
The Article addresses obvious objections to the displacement of criminal traffic
enforcement with a system of "How's My Driving?"-based civil fines. Namely, it
suggests that using the sorts of feedback algorithms that eBay and other reputation-
tracking systems have employed can ameliorate the problems associated with false
and malicious feedback. The Article also explains why driver distraction costs
would be manageable and addresses privacy and due process implications of the
proposed regime.
The core strategy animating "How's My Driving?" for Everyone is to use tech-
nology to transform loose-knit environments, where reputation often fails to con-
strain antisocial behavior, into close-knit environments, where reputation
constrains misbehavior more effectively. Using such technologies, society can
replace state policing with citizen policing and laws with norms. The Article con-
cludes by examining various nondriving applications of feedback technologies to
help regulate the conduct of soldiers, police officers, hotel guests, sports spectators,
and participants in virtual worlds, among others.
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INTRODUCTION
Harnessing the knowledge created by technologies that aggregate
dispersed information has become a central concern of legal aca-
demics, economists, and policymakers in the new millennium. Some
academic work has focused on information aggregators like
Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia to which anyone can contribute
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and that is more extensive than Britannica and nearly as accurate.'
Others have explored the virtues of information markets, which seem
capable of predicting future events with greater accuracy than any
assembled group of experts. 2 Still more academic work examines the
growing importance of open source collaboration and peer production
of intellectual property, where thousands of computer programmers
scattered around the world team up to produce better code and then
disperse immediately thereafter.3 Simultaneously, many economists
have explored eBay's extraordinarily successful system for aggre-
gating and displaying reputation information for millions of unique
users.4 And organizational theorists have proselytized on behalf of
various knowledge-transfer strategies that improve performance in
I See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE
(forthcoming 2006) (describing benefits of Wikipedia and other resources for aggregating
dispersed information); Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head: Jimmy
Wales' Wikipedia Comes Close to Britannica in Terms of the Accuracy of Its Science Entries,
a Nature Investigation Finds, 438 NATURE 900, 900 (2005) (discussing Nature investigation
that found Wikipedia is not significantly less accurate than Britannica).
2 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 (discussing performance of information markets in
predicting future events); Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Deci-
sionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 933-43, 949-51
(2004) (analyzing use of information markets to improve government decisionmaking);
Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 Am. U. L. REV. 327, 328-35
(1999) (discussing and critiquing proposals to use market mechanisms in various legal con-
texts); Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from
the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 591
(2003) (discussing Iowa Electronic Market and noting that it outperformed major polling
organizations); Charles R. Plott, Markets As Information Gathering Tools, 67 S. ECON. J. 1,
9-12 (2000) (describing experiments that involved simulated markets collecting, broad-
casting, and aggregating information); Charles R. Plott et al., Parimutuel Betting Markets as
Information Aggregation Devices: Experimental Results, 22 ECON. THEORY 311 (2003)
(exploring ability of parimutuel betting systems to aggregate fragmented information and
accurately predict probabilities of certain outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments:
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 967, 1024
(2005) (arguing that information markets outperform deliberating groups).
3 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 63-90 (2006); SUNSTEIN,
supra note 1; Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, Does a Seller's Ecommerce Reputation
Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 337, 340-47 (2002) (analyzing
empirical data on effect of seller's eBay reputation on price of products); Paul Resnick &
Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis
of eBay's Reputation System 3 (Feb. 5, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
www-csag.ucsd.edu/teaching/cse225s04/Reading%2OList/E-bay-Empirical-BodegaBay.pdf)
(discussing manner in which eBay's reputation system operates); Stephen S. Standifird,
Reputation and E-commerce: eBay Auctions and the Asymmetrical Impact of Positive and
Negative Ratings, 27 J. MGMT. 279, 281 (2001) (discussing importance of reputation as
mechanism for reducing risks of e-commerce).
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
November 2006]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
companies and agencies by facilitating the efficient flow of informa-
tion up and down the chain of command. 5
This Article takes the next step in the aggregation of dispersed
information literature. Namely, it explores the use of information
aggregation technologies to deter, detect, and punish citizen miscon-
duct. This Article focuses on the most promising and significant appli-
cation of this approach to law enforcement: traffic regulation.
The stakes associated with traffic accidents and commuting-
related stresses are enormous. Vehicular collisions are the leading
killer of Americans aged fifteen to twenty-nine6 and the nation's
fourth largest cause of lost disability-adjusted life years.7 Worldwide,
traffic accidents kill nearly 1.2 million people annually.8 Recent eco-
nomic research has placed commuting at the very bottom of the hap-
piness index, easily ranking as the least pleasurable major life activity
in which Americans engage. 9 Despite this, the average American
worker spends more than forty-eight miserable minutes a day com-
muting to and from work, 10 completely frustrated by his inability to do
5 See, e.g., Linda Argote & Paul Ingram, Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive
Advantage in Firms, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 150
(2000) (arguing that knowledge transfer can create competitive advantage for firms);
Bradley C. Karkainnen, Information As Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) (analyzing EPA's
Toxic Release Inventory and arguing that it succeeds by creating transparent, information-
rich environment); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and
Organizational Forms, 11 ORG. Sci. 538 (2000) (arguing that some organizational forms
provide better motivation for knowledge transfer); Jeremy C. Stein, Information Produc-
tion and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1891 (2002)
(discussing ways in which organizational design affects capital allocation to competing
projects).
6 Michael Sivak, How Common Sense Fails Us on the Road: Contribution of Bounded
Rationality to the Annual Worldwide Toll of One Million Traffic Fatalities, 5 TRANSP. RES.
PART F 259, 260 (2002); see also Reginald G. Smart & Robert E. Mann, Is Road Rage a
Serious Traffic Problem?, 3 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 183, 187 (2002) (noting that car
accidents "account for about 40% of all deaths of those between the ages of 15 and 24 in
Canada").
7 Sivak, supra note 6, at 260. For an exploration of the social costs of traffic fatalities,
see Gunnar Lindberg, Traffic Insurance and Accident Externality Charges, 35 J. TRANS-
PORT ECON. & POL'Y 399, 414 (2001), which estimates that the total social costs of traffic
accidents in Sweden are equal to 2.7% of gross domestic product.
8 Margie Peden, The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention: Getting Public
Health to Do More 3 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at www.rospa.com/road-
safety/conferences/congress2005/info/peden.pdf).
9 Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience:
The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl.1 (2004).
10 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Americans Spend More than 100
Hours Commuting to Work Each Year, Census Bureau Reports (Mar. 30, 2005), available
at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/american-community-
survey-acs/004489.html (noting average morning commute of twenty-four minutes). This
data includes all Americans who work outside their homes. The average roundtrip corn-
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anything about the relatively small number of obnoxious drivers who
are imposing substantial costs on everyone else.
There is, in short, far more blood on the pavement in the realm of
traffic law than there can ever be from intellectual property, corpo-
rate, or e-commerce law. Yet while scholars in those fields have
begun showing how aggregated information can be harnessed to
improve laws and lives, scholars interested in transportation policy
have virtually ignored these insights." That blind spot is surprising,
given that the dispersed information relevant to transportation regula-
tion is so readily available and can be gathered quite inexpensively,
yet virtually all of it presently goes to waste. Were that information
harnessed, by contrast, it might be used to save thousands of lives and
push criminal laws to the margins.
Among the various technologies that have facilitated the aggrega-
tion of dispersed information, eBay's reputation system may be the
most successful so far. We can underscore the importance of eBay's
seller reputation scores by imagining what it would be like to buy
items on eBay without them: Buyers would face the constant risk that
a seller might abscond with the proceeds of a sale, necessitating signif-
icant expenditures on escrow services for nearly every transaction.
Even using escrow, there would be substantial problems in the
absence of seller reputation rankings. Some buyers would discover
after the fact that they had purchased counterfeit, defective, or stolen
goods, and they would be left with little recourse beyond tracking
down and suing far-flung sellers. Law enforcement authorities might
occasionally prosecute the worst offenders for mail fraud or traf-
ficking in counterfeit goods, but the vast majority of wrongdoers
would escape into the ether, taking the money of trusting buyers with
them. As a result, buyers would be scared away from dealing with
obscure sellers, and the prices paid for goods on eBay would drop
substantially. 12
A modern, urban freeway is a lot like eBay without reputation
scores. Most drivers on the freeway are reasonably skilled and willing
mute exceeded one hour per day in New York City, Newark, Chicago, and Riverside,
California. Id.
11 Traffic law scholarship is presently peripheral in legal academic discourse. It is not at
all clear why that should be so. Besides the enormous number of lives and dollars at stake,
traffic law remains the body of law with which ordinary Americans interact most fre-
quently, and it is the primary locus of citizens' interactions with the police. Moreover,
traffic law is the only set of laws about which adult Americans are routinely tested, and it is
probably the body of law best understood by the lay public.
12 This outcome reflects the "lemons" scenario developed in George A. Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488,
495 (1970).
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to cooperate conditionally with fellow drivers, but there is a sizable
minority that imposes substantial costs on other drivers, in the form of
accidents, delays, stress, incivility, and rising insurance premiums.
Because enforcement of the traffic laws by police officers is sporadic
and often targeted toward those offenses that are easiest to prove as
opposed to those that impose the greatest harm on motorists, insur-
ance companies face substantial obstacles sorting among the good
drivers and the bad. As a result, safe drivers pay higher premiums,
and good drivers who are part of demographic groups that are acci-
dent-prone pay far higher premiums, than they would if insurance
companies had perfect information.
Just as eBay developed a successful technological solution to the
problem of online auctions among Internet users, there are sensible
and attainable technological solutions to the problems created by
motorist anonymity. These technological solutions could produce
enormous social benefits in the form of lives saved, property damage
avoided, everyday unhappiness alleviated, road rage mitigated, and
law enforcement resources redeployed. An urban freeway contains
thousands of motorists who are watching their fellow motorists drive
and who are often talking (to themselves or passengers) about who is
driving well or poorly. Using available technologies to harness this
dispersed information could generate great welfare gains.
Can this information be put to use? It appears so. The best avail-
able evidence suggests that using "How's My Driving?" placards on
commercial vehicles substantially improves fleet safety. This Article
proposes a massive expansion of these primitive placards with the
implementation of a novel program called "'How's My Driving?' for
Everyone."
Part I discusses the central role that anonymity and obscurity play
in creating dysfunction on urban, suburban, and exurban roadways. It
discusses the existing studies regarding "How's My Driving?" pro-
grams for commercial fleets, all of which suggest that the programs
substantially reduce vehicular collisions. Lastly, it introduces a uni-
versal "How's My Driving?" program, whereby all drivers would be
required to participate in a reputation-monitoring regime. Part II
makes the case for this program, which would enable society to put
scarce law enforcement resources to better use, ensure that the forms
of motorist misconduct that impose the greatest costs on others
receive the harshest sanctions, and reduce information asymmetries in
the insurance market. It could also make commuting a far less miser-
able experience, both by making driving safer and by reducing road
rage. Part III explores the potential drawbacks associated with a
mandatory and universal "How's My Driving?" program. This Part
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
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assesses the magnitude of the inaccurate or malicious feedback
problem, examines the associated driver distraction costs, compares
the effectiveness of "How's My Driving?" feedback to automated safe
driving technologies, and considers the privacy and due process objec-
tions to such a system. This Part concludes by examining whether a
mandatory, universal "How's My Driving?" scheme is preferable to
letting the market do as it will. Part IV discusses the many variations
and policy options that would arise if the government implemented a
"How's My Driving?" for Everyone regime. Part V considers the
broader theoretical importance of the insights derived from this case
study by exploring other policy domains in which the approach of
replacing state policing with reputation tracking and decentralized
enforcement could pay dividends. It suggests that "How's My
Driving"-style regimes have the capacity to displace the state's tradi-
tional role of enacting and enforcing substantive laws. To that end, it
ponders the question of when such displacement is appropriate.
I
ANONYMITY AND AGGRESSIVE DRIVING
"Motorist anonymity" arises when another driver observes my
behavior but is unable to identify me as Lior Strahilevitz, as opposed
to, say, some guy in a dark green Honda Civic.
The problems associated with urban and suburban driving are, by
and large, creatures of motorist anonymity. That statement may seem
too bold to readers accustomed to hearing about drunken driving,
drowsy driving, and road rage. But a review of the literature on
driving suggests that these problems largely stem from roadway ano-
nymity. If society were able to monitor its roadways around the clock
and to analyze this data immediately to identify and punish problem-
atic motorists, many of the traffic accident deaths that occur every
year would be averted. A dangerous driving environment is the
almost inevitable consequence of sporadic traffic law enforcement by
the police combined with rare traffic norm enforcement by motorists.
The evidence of a link between anonymity and aggressive driving
is reflected in numerous studies, all of which reach essentially the
same conclusion: People are more likely to drive aggressively when
they can avoid sanctions, but drive courteously when they believe they
will be held accountable for misconduct. 13 The cleverest of these
13 See, e.g., Ann M. Brewer, Road Rage: What, Who, When, Where and How?, 20
TRANSPORT REVIEWS 49, 55 (2000) ("Drivers feel anonymous in their vehicles and conse-
quently behave differently in a driving context compared with a non-driving one.");
Patricia A. Ellison et al., Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behavior. A Field Study, 10 J.
Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 265, 266-71 (1995) (finding that more anonymous drivers
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
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studies found that drivers of convertibles behave more aggressively
with their tops up than their tops down,14 even though hotter weather
is associated with both one's top being down and aggressive driving.'5
This observational evidence is consistent with data showing that road
rage is relatively rare in those areas where roadway anonymity is
diminished, such as small rural communities,1 6 and that people drive
more aggressively when they are driving alone than when there are
passengers in their cars. 17
The link between aggressive driving and undesirable roadway
incidents, such as accidents, near misses, high-stress situations, and
road rage, is similarly uncontroversial, though its magnitude is the
subject of some debate.18 In the most extensive literature review to
honked sooner, longer, and more frequently); Richard W. Harding et al., Road Rage and
the Epidemiology of Violence: Something Old, Something New, 7 STUD. ON CRIME &
CRIME PREVENTION 221, 235-36 (1998) (arguing that anonymity of driving facilitates
aggression); Rebecca Lawton & Amanda Nutter, A Comparison of Reported Levels and
Expression of Anger in Everyday and Driving Situations, 93 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 407, 408,
420 (2002) (concluding, based on empirical data, that anonymity encourages aggressive
behavior); Leo Tasca, A Review of the Literature on Aggressive Driving Research 3 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.aggressive.drivers.com/papers/tasca/
tasca.pdf) (finding that drivers are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior in situa-
tions that confer anonymity).
14 Ellison et al., supra note 13, at 266-71.
15 L.F. Lowenstein, Research into Causes and Manifestations of Aggression in Car
Driving, 70 POLICE J. 263, 265-66 (1997). In commuting environments where strangers
interact face-to-face, levels of cooperation and friendly behavior are higher than they are
on urban freeways. See, e.g., Matthew L. Fried & Victor J. DeFazio, Territoriality and
Boundary Conflicts in the Subway, 37 PSYCHIATRY 47, 55 (1974) (describing cooperative
behavior among subway passengers, such as standing in a crowded section of a subway car
so as to provide opposite-sex couples with extra personal space).
16 Mark Asbridge et al., The "Homogamy" of Road Rage: Understanding the Relation-
ship Between Victimization and Offending Among Aggressive and Violent Motorists, 18
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 517, 528 (2003); see also Harding et al., supra note 13, at 225 (noting
that "only 7% of road rage incidents occurred in non-metropolitan areas ... even though
27% of the population resides there"); Chris S. Dula, Validity and Reliability Assessment
of a Dangerous Driving Self-Report Measure 1 (Mar. 26, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute) (on file with the New York University Law Review)
("In metropolitan areas, aggressive driving and road rage seem to be of particular
concern.").
17 Trinidad Rueda-Domingo et al., The Influence of Passengers on the Risk of the Driver
Causing a Car Collision in Spain: Analysis of Collisions from 1990 to 1999, 36 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 481, 486 (2004); David Shinar & Richard Compton, Aggressive
Driving: An Observational Study of Driver, Vehicle, and Situational Variables, 36 Accl-
DENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 429, 433 (2004).
18 See ELIZABETH M. GREY ET AL., FED. OFFICE OF RD. SAFETY, REPORT No. CR 81,
DRIVER AGGRESSION: THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY, SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, RISK AND
MOTIVATION 49 (1989) (noting that most accident-free drivers tend to be compulsively
nonaggressive); Frank A. Drews et al., On the Fast Lane to Road Rage, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL DRIVING SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN FACTORS IN DRIVER
ASSESSMENT, TRAINING AND VEHICLE DESIGN 194, 194 (2003), available at http://ppc.
uiowa.edu/driving-assessment/2003/Summaries/Downloads/Final-Papers/PDF/44_Drews
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date, Galovski, Malta, and Blanchard concluded that "more than 40
years of descriptive and experimental research studies have supported
a reliable association between aggressive driving and increased risk of
[motor vehicle accidents]."' 19 According to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, aggressive driving causes approximately
one-third of all motor vehicle accidents in the United States and two-
thirds of all domestic vehicular fatalities.20 Motorists agree that the
problem is very serious: Aggressive driving is three-and-one-half
times more likely than drunken driving to be identified as the most
pressing traffic safety problem. 21
So far, our story is straightforward. People are prone to aggres-
sive driving when they feel that anonymity shields them from liability
or social sanctions. This aggressive driving, in turn, causes substantial
traffic accidents and fatalities. But that is not the only connection
between roadway anonymity and adverse traffic outcomes. A study
by Harding and coauthors presents the most comprehensive account
of the psychology of aggressive driving. The authors make a con-
vincing case that aggressive behavior by anonymous drivers triggers
further aggression by those around them, who wish to punish viola-
tions of driving norms but feel powerless to do so in light of the ano-
nymity of the norm violators.22 That is, many motorists who witness
bad driving or aggressive driving become frustrated by their inability
to sanction the offending motorists, and, as a result, they often engage
in retaliatory aggressive driving or, worse yet, extreme acts of felo-
format.pdf (citing Department of Transportation estimate that two-thirds of 42,000 auto-
mobile accident deaths in 1996 were from aggressive driving); Jerry L. Deffenbacher et al.,
Development of a Driving Anger Scale, 74 PSYCHOL. REP. 83, 84 (1994) (concluding that
anger while driving may cause aggressive behavior that increases accident risk); Reginald
G. Smart et al., Can We Design Cars to Prevent Road Rage?, 1 INT'L J. VEHICLE INFO. &
COMM. Sys. 44, 46 (2005) (describing road rage as "a serious social and public health
problem"); Tasca, supra note 13, at 3 (arguing that there is insufficient data to determine
whether road rage is increasing); Louis Tijerina, Issues in the Evaluation of Driver Distrac-
tion Associated with In-Vehicle Information and Telecommunications Systems 6 (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-13/driver-
distraction/PDF/3.pdf) (discussing connection between "close car following" (i.e., tail-
gating) and crashes).
19 TARA E. GALOVSKI ET AL., ROAD RAGE: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF THE
ANGRY, AGGRESSIVE DRIVER 13 (2006).
20 Road Rage: Causes and Dangers of Aggressive Driving: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Surface Transportation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure,
105th Cong. 10 (1997) (statement of Ricardo Martinez, Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/announce/testi-
mony/aggres2.html.
21 Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 429.
22 Harding et al., supra note 13, at 222-31.
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nious road rage.2 3 This research suggests that the absence of a mea-
sured social sanction for roadway norm violations can prompt extreme
overreactions. Many aggressive drivers, on this account, drive aggres-
sively in an attempt "to communicate to other road users that they are
angry."' 24 Yet the nature of roadway interactions makes it difficult to
express this anger in a proportional way and even more difficult for
offending drivers to express remorse unambiguously.
In light of this data, we should expect to see programs that reduce
roadway anonymity substantially decreasing aggressive driving and
vehicular collisions. The best available data from the most prominent
such program strongly supports that hypothesis.
A. "How's My Driving?" for Commercial Fleets
It is likely that readers of this Article have seen bumper stickers
or placards emblazoned on the back of commercial trucks, vans, and
buses asking the question: "How's My Driving? Call 1-800-XXX-
XXXX with compliments or complaints." Motorists dial these phone
numbers, typically using cellular phones, to report good or bad
behavior by commercial drivers. The monitoring company employees
who answer these calls then make a report of each incident, including
details about the incident, the reporter's identity, and the road condi-
tions. This data is immediately provided to the fleet operator, who
usually investigates each incident, tracks reports about each driver,
conducts training sessions to correct recurring problems, and sanctions
repeat offenders where appropriate. 25
In recent years, companies that operate "How's My Driving?"
(HMD) programs have expanded their operations substantially.26
This expansion has been fueled by various studies, mainly conducted
by insurance companies, showing that the implementation of HMD
placards, along with systems for monitoring the performance of indi-
vidual drivers and investigating complaints, engender substantial
23 Id.; see also Smart et al., supra note 18, at 47 (stating that obscene gestures or verbal
abuse are precipitating factors in sixty-four percent of road rage cases); Raymond W.
Novaco, Automobile Driving and Aggressive Behavior 20-21 (Univ. of Cal. Transp. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 42, 1991) (noting that aggressive driving and pursuit are common
responses, especially among males, when other motorists drive in annoying manner);
Sheila Sarkar et al., Spatial and Temporal Analyses of the Variations in Aggressive Driving
and Road Rage Behaviors Observed and Reported on San Diego Freeways 6 (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.aggressive.drivers.com/papers/smekw/
smekw.pdf) (arguing that road rage can result from retaliation against aggressive driving).
24 Lawton & Nutter, supra note 13, at 407.
25 RONALD R. KNIPLING ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRUCK AND Bus SAFETY § 4.7 (2003).
26 Trebor Banstetter, How's My Driving Calls Keep Truckers in Line, Studies Say, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 20, 1999, at 1A.
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reductions in accidents and losses. Reviewing these studies, Knipling
et al. reported:
[S]everal studies, mostly by insurance providers, have researched
the efficacy of using safety placards, such as "How's My Driving"
stickers in improving safety in [commercial motor vehicles]. These
studies have shown significant reductions in vehicle crashes, insur-
ance premiums, and DOT reportable crashes when fleets used
safety placards with an effective feedback loop, that is, feedback
combined with training and instruction. For example, the Hanover
Insurance Co. conducted a study with 11 different trucking fleets
(n = 445 trucks) using "How's My Driving" safety placards and
reported a 22% reduction in crash rate and a 52% reduction in
crash costs after 1 year.27
Other insurance company analyses, reported in press accounts, have
found similarly substantial benefits from HMD: Reliance Insurance
Company found that implementing HMD placards was associated
with a 35% reduction in crash costs in the first year, 28 and Fireman's
Fund Insurance found a 20% reduction in accidents.2 9 Unpublished
insurance company studies-supplied to the author by Driver's Alert,
a major player in the HMD market-suggested similar results: A
Great West Casualty Company study of 78 trucking companies found
that in the two years after they implemented HMD programs, loss
ratios30 improved by 51 %, and accident frequency dropped by 53 %.31
John Deere Transportation Insurance's study of 63 companies found a
45% decline in loss ratio and a 33% decline in accidents.32 Other
fleets instituting HMD programs have seen similar improvements. 33
Insurance studies of the installation of electronic monitoring "black
boxes" in commercial fleets and passenger vehicles have shown, by
contrast, only a 20% reduction in accidents.34
27 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, § 5.3.4 (citations omitted); see also Jim Emerson,
Driving Test: Hanover Insurance Co. Uses Teleservices Monitoring to Cut Insurance Losses,
DIRECT, Feb. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 5531465 (reporting results from same
Hanover study).
28 Banstetter, supra note 26.
29 Deb Riechmann, Firms Get Good Mileage out of "How's My Driving?," PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 26, 1999, at C1.
30 To calculate a loss ratio, an insurer aggregates the costs associated with accident
claims and divides that amount by net earned premiums.
31 Driver's Alert: Safety Management Systems (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Driver's Alert].
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Joey Ledford, "How's My Driving?" Draws a Response, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Dec. 24, 2001, at B5; How's My Driving? Helps Firms Slash Accident Rates, FLEET
NEWS, July 3, 1998, at 32.
34 MATTHIAS ROETING ET AL., LIBERTY MUT. RESEARCH INST. FOR SAFETY, TRUCK
DRIVERS' ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS TOWARDS FEEDBACK BY IN-VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY,
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These results are striking, suggesting that existing HMD pro-
grams may result in large cost savings and prevent many injuries and
deaths. That said, to the best of my knowledge, no study of the effec-
tiveness of HMD programs has ever appeared in a peer-reviewed
journal. This dearth of peer-reviewed studies should prompt caution,
in part because it would be useful to know whether the insurance
industry studies adequately accounted for selection effects, 35 and also
because of a concern that any studies finding HMD programs to be
ineffective may have been suppressed. The published data, however,
is almost uniformly positive. One survey did suggest that many com-
mercial fleet safety managers were not enamored with the effective-
ness of HMD programs; however, the survey had significant design
problems that may explain the result.36 On the other hand, those
intrigued by the data presented above can take some comfort that all
of the available studies point in the same direction, that some sophisti-
cated insurance companies are willing to put their money where their
mouths are by providing discounts to commercial fleets that imple-
ment HMD programs,37 and that the market for HMD services has
available at http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/IAAPdivl3/ICTrP2004papers2/ITS/
Roetting.pdf; Peter I.J. Wouters & John M.J. Bos, Traffic Accident Reduction by Moni-
toring Driver Behaviour with In-Car Data Recorders, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVEN-
TION 643, 649 (2000).
35 More specifically, it may be that companies sign up for HMD programs when they
are also implementing other beneficial safety measures, or that they are likely to sign up
for HMD programs after incurring unusually large losses from accidents during a particular
year and that the HMD improvements reflect regression to the mean.
36 Whereas many safety coordinators at commercial trucking companies did not rank
"How's My Driving placards and 800 numbers" highly as an effective safety strategy, they
ranked "continuous tracking of driver's crashes/incidents/violations" as the third most
important safety strategy among twenty-eight strategies. KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25,
§ 2.2.1 tbl.2. Tracking crashes and violations is relatively easy for commercial fleets, but if
"incidents" refers to something other than "crashes" and "violations," then the only way to
track such "incidents" would be through driver reports obtained from HMD. Indeed, all
HMD services provide a toll-free hotline and detailed incident reports and tracking reports
for particular drivers. It therefore seems likely that the survey designers' decision to distin-
guish HMD placards from "continuous tracking" of driver conduct resulted in the former
being ranked as less effective. Knipling and coauthors themselves echo a similar concern,
noting forthrightly the puzzling fact that "safety managers and other experts rated the
practice of crash, incident, and violation tracking as highly effective ... but they did not
highly value the monitoring of the source safety behaviors creating these outcomes." Id.
§ 5.3.5. An alternative explanation for the poor performance of HMD placards in the
Knipling survey is that fleet safety managers are almost always former truck drivers, id.
§ 1.1, and survey research reveals that truck drivers are typically hostile to receiving
motorist feedback via HMD numbers, though they generally welcome feedback from
fellow truckers and their safety supervisors, ROETTING ET AL., supra note 34; Yueng-
Hsiang Huang et al., In-Vehicle Safety Feedback, PROF. SAFETY, Jan. 2005, at 20, 24 tbl.3,
27.
37 Riechmann, supra note 29; see also State Encounters Problem with Plan for "How's
My Driving?" Stickers, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 29, 2004, at 5A (describing 2002
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grown dramatically in the last few years, both in the United States and
abroad. 38 In short, an increasing number of businesses have been bet-
ting big on this technology in recent years, and they seem pleased with
their investment. At the end of the day, then, there is reasonably per-
suasive evidence that HMD programs produce substantial improve-
ments in fleet safety, and the evidence is certainly strong enough to
warrant rigorous investigation by transportation scholars.
Assuming the existing data reveals a causal effect, and HMD pro-
grams do reduce collisions and collision-related losses, to what can we
attribute these improvements in fleet safety? There appear to be two
mechanisms at play. First, the presence of these placards reminds
commercial fleet drivers that they are accountable for behavior that is
likely to annoy fellow motorists.39 Being watched acts as a deterrent
to bad acts. Second, the information obtained from HMD calls allows
commercial fleets to identify the worst drivers for extra training or
dismissal.40 Typically, 80% of fleet drivers receive complaints rarely,
and 10-20% receive complaints frequently.41 This data is consistent
with other industry data showing that at most commercial trucking
firms studied, the worst 10-20% of drivers are responsible for the
majority of all collisions.42 It is also worth noting that the nature of
the complaints logged by HMD companies suggests that motorists
generally call to complain about driving behaviors that are particularly
likely to lead to accidents. Driver's Alert data classifies all calls into
one of the following categories, and reports the frequency of calls as
follows: speeding (21%); tailgating (11%); unsafe lane change (23%);
illegal passing (4%); failure to yield (5%); failure to stop (6%); illegal
parking (2%); compliment (8%); weaving (15%); miscellaneous
(5%).43 If most of these reports are truthful, then it is easy to see how
commercial fleet managers can use HMD data to identify the most
accident-prone drivers.44
study by West Virginia's Governor's Office of Fiscal Risk Analysis and Management that
predicted state government would save $2.5 million annually by placing HMD stickers on
all state vehicles).
38 See, e.g., IrishTrucker.com, How's My Driving?, http://irishtrucker.com/articles/2004/
april/hmd.asp (last visited July 5, 2006).
39 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, § 4.7.
40 Id.
41 Id. § 5.3.4; Emerson, supra note 27; see also Riechmann, supra note 29.
42 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, § 5.2.1; see also Riechmann, supra note 29.
43 Driver's Alert, supra note 31; see also Emerson, supra note 27 (stating that most
common complaints to HMD call centers "include tailgating, running red lights, speeding,
improper lane changes and cutting off other drivers").
44 Truckers Turn Toward Safety When Being Monitored, J. COM., Nov. 16, 1998, at 12A
("Most commercial drivers are good drivers, but about 10 percent to 15 percent drive
aggressively-tailgating, weaving in and out of traffic and speeding . . . .That kind of
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B. The Expansion of "How's My Driving?"
Programs to Automobiles
HMD programs began in the 1980s as a system for reducing com-
mercial fleet crashes. 45 During the 1990s and in this decade, several
companies began targeting a second market niche: passenger vehicles
driven by teenagers. 46 The idea is basically the same as in the com-
mercial context. Vehicular collisions are the leading cause of death
for American youths.47 Little wonder, then, that parents worry about
their children's safety and the safety of nearby motorists and pedest-
rians. Under HMD-for-teens programs, placards and bumper stickers
are installed on the teenagers' cars, and all incident reports are con-
veyed directly to the parents. So far, it does not appear that the effec-
tiveness of these programs has been studied, although there is little
reason to expect that the results would be much different from those
associated with commercial fleet HMD programs. 4s HMD programs
for teens elicit information that supplements accident reports and
tickets. Parents of teens with "clean" driving records report receiving
valid critical feedback through HMD stickers, which they then use to
take corrective action.49
C. Inadequacies of Existing HMD Programs
The apparent effectiveness of HMD programs is rather surprising
in light of the fact that complaints flow into HMD call centers at an
unimpressive rate. For example, HMD decals on 3000 Sysco trucks
prompted only 435 incident reports to the HMD call center during
driving causes severe crashes [and also] gets people annoyed enough to call the 800
number on the sticker.").
45 Ledford, supra note 33.
46 Rex Bowman, An Eye on Teen-Agers, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2000, at
E-1; Michael Squires, New Program to Help Parents Monitor Their Teenage Drivers, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 19, 2003, at 2B; Lynn Waddell, Teen Driving: I'm Gonna Go Tell
Mom!, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 2004, at 9.
47 Sivak, supra note 6, at 260.
48 Where HMD programs have achieved little market penetration, commercial and
noncommercial drivers evidently engage in aggressive driving at approximately the same
rates. Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 434. Shinar and Compton reached this conclu-
sion on the basis of a large-scale observational study near Tel Aviv prior to 2003. Id. at
429-30. "How's My Driving?" stickers first appeared on Israeli trucks and busses during
2005. Barry Newman, Steering Committee, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 8, 2005, at 4. Parents
may have fewer driver training resources at their disposal than commercial fleet compa-
nies, but they also have fewer drivers to monitor. Parents might limit or revoke the driving
privileges of teenagers whose actions generate complaints, while rewarding those whose
call logs suggest they are good drivers.
49 Jean Nash Johnson, Moms Make a Web Site to Monitor Teen Drivers, PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CIrY, July 31, 2005, at G1.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
1712 [Vol. 81:1699
HOW'S MY DRIVING?
1998.50 Data provided to the author by Driver's Alert revealed
slightly higher call volumes: 260 calls in a five-month period for Sonic
Express's 1330 vehicles in 1999; 14 calls in the same period for
Northern Beverage's 98 vehicles; and 8 calls during the five-month
period for Mass Construction's 20 vehicles.5' Yet despite these rather
low call volumes, insurance studies conducted during this period still
showed that HMD programs produced substantial reductions in acci-
dents and losses.
This relative dearth of calls is not entirely surprising, given that
reports to HMD call centers are something of a public good. Drivers
have virtually no economic incentive to complain about commercial
fleet drivers whose vehicles sport HMD placards, and they incur some
costs when doing so. In addition to the time and effort required to
make the call, callers incur cell phone airtime charges and are exposed
to an increased risk of a collision while reaching for the phone or a
pen to facilitate an HMD report. Using a simplistic model of homo
economicus, the question is why anyone bothers to contribute to this
public good when doing so is costly.52
Yet the same question can be asked in the eBay context and in
the context of services like Wikipedia, CNET.com, Amazon's product
ratings, the Zagat Survey, Download.com, and Tripadvisor.com. Nev-
ertheless, in all those contexts, an extraordinarily valuable public
good-accurate and helpful information that is readily available to the
public-has arisen based on the voluntary contribution of feedback
from mostly anonymous or pseudonymous users. EBay is the online
forum that attracts the greatest level of participation. Feedback is
provided in half of all eBay transactions,5 3 even though transaction
partners do not expect to, and probably never will, engage in future
transactions,54 and even though a buyer whose seller has already pro-
vided favorable feedback has no economic incentive to provide feed-
back about the seller. 55
Not coincidentally, eBay is also the service where users face the
lowest costs of providing feedback. Indeed, eBay's software encour-
ages users to leave feedback by reminding them after each transaction
has been completed. The incentive to provide feedback is cast in
50 Riechmann, supra note 29.
51 Driver's Alert, supra note 31.
52 Asking and answering these questions is a theme in some of my other work. See,
e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Coop-
eration on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505 (2003) (examining users' will-
ingness to upload content on peer-to-peer file-swapping networks).
53 Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 3.
54 Id. at 9.
55 Id. at 20.
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various ways: as a civic duty, an act of reciprocity, a common cour-
tesy, or a chance to reward good conduct and avenge misconduct.5 6
Though eBay's reputation system is admittedly imperfect, it has been
extraordinarily successful at preventing fraud among auction
participants.5 7
Robert Frank has suggested that an emotional desire for ven-
geance often motivates people to sanction those whose misbehavior
imposes costs on others. 58 If we examine the nature of calls to HMD
services, it appears that this desire for vengeance and concern for per-
sonal and community safety are the primary factors motivating indi-
viduals to call in complaints. 59 We know from a study of San Diego's
freeways that motorists do call the police in nontrivial numbers to
complain about fellow motorists' aggressive driving, despite the
absence of any organized program to encourage such calls and the
nonexistence of any organized effort by law enforcement to respond
to these calls in a timely manner.60 And in 1995, when Maryland insti-
tuted a campaign asking motorists who observed aggressive driving to
inform the state police by dialing #77 on their cell phones, the line
received as many as 200 calls a day.61 Yet when police receive reports
of aggressive driving, they do not usually issue a citation unless they
can intercept the vehicle that sparked the complaint and observe
56 Id. at 5.
57 Rong-Ruey Duh et al., Control and Assurance in E-Commerce: Privacy, Integrity,
and Security at eBay, 3 TAIWAN AccT. REV. 1, 15 (2002) ("The eBay feedback forum
seems to be an efficient ... way of enforcing ... integrity in online auctions."); Nolan
Miller et al., Eliciting Honest Feedback in Electronic Markets 3 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov't, Working Paper No. RWP02-039, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=
348940 ("[EBay's] overall rate of successful transactions remains astonishingly high.").
58 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 53 (1988).
59 See supra text accompanying note 43 (listing types of behavior reported by callers).
Because of this dynamic, whereby people obtain utility by sanctioning those who engage in
antisocial behavior, the methodological challenges that arise when surveys and other
instruments attempt to elicit accurate information from respondents are mitigated. For
discussions of some of these challenges in the survey context, see Tomas Philipson, Data
Markets and the Production of Surveys, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 47, 60-67, 70-71 (1997),
describing biases in the production of survey data, and Tomas Philipson & Anup Malani,
Measurement Errors: A Principal Investigator-Agent Approach, 91 J. ECONOMETRICS 273,
280-96 (1999), discussing the use of incentives to decrease errors in the supply of survey
information.
60 Sarkar et al., supra note 23, at 2. The Sarkar study found that during a three-month
period in which the California Highway Patrol tracked calls related to aggressive driving
on San Diego freeways, it logged nearly 2000 such calls. Id. Ten percent of survey respon-
dents in the same study reported that they have called the police on their cell phones to
report aggressive drivers in the past. Id. at 18.
61 Kevin Johnson, Frustration Drives Road Rage, TRAFFIC SAFETY, July/Aug. 1997, at 8,
11.
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unlawful conduct.62 It is also worth noting that unlike eBay, which
exhibits a "Pollyanna effect," whereby feedback is overly positive, 63
HMD services elicit responses that are overwhelmingly negative. 64
The lesson here is that when it comes to driving, some people do gain
welfare by reporting misconduct because they see it as a welcome
opportunity to punish the misbehaving driver. We can expect that
when the costs of tattling fall, the quantity of tattling will rise.
Of course, the costs of tattling are falling substantially. In the
past decade, the number of Americans who own cell phones has
skyrocketed, 65 as has the prevalence of cell phone use by motorists.66
One would predict that the increased availability of cell phones has
resulted in increased call volumes to HMD call centers, although in
the last couple of years some states have tried to curtail driver distrac-
tion by mandating the use of hands-free devices. 67 The hypothesis put
forward to explain the HMD program's effectiveness-that it deters
bad driving and allows firms to target the worst drivers for training
and/or dismissal-suggests that as call volumes increase, the effective-
ness of these programs also increases.
I shall conclude this subsection with what I regard as a critical
fact that supports the hypothesis that there is a great deal of addi-
tional information about individual drivers that currently goes to
waste. It comes from an ingenious experiment run by Andrew
McGarva and Michelle Steiner.68 McGarva and Steiner set up a con-
trolled experiment whereby subjects, driving their own motor vehi-
cles, believed their driving tendencies and behaviors were being
evaluated by a researcher sitting in the passenger seat.69 In fact, the
questions the researcher asked each subject were a ruse, designed to
62 Michael Miller, How's My Driving? Behavior Can Impact Business Image, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Dec. 14, 2001.
63 Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 11. For a description of the Pollyanna effect,
see infra text accompanying note 215.
64 See supra text accompanying note 43.
65 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Cell Phone Use Up More than 300
Percent (Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/
archives/miscellaneous/003136.html (reporting that number of cell phones in United States
increased from 34 million in 1995 to 159 million in 2003).
66 DONNA GLASSBRENNER, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP'T OF
TRANSP., DOT HS 809 580, CELL PHONE USE ON THE ROADS IN 2002, at 7 fig.4 (2005)
(estimating that between 2000 and 2002, number of drivers using cell phones at any given
time between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. in United States increased from 501,593 to 850,753).
67 MELISSA A. SAVAGE ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE STATE OF LEGISLATURES,
TRAFFIC SAFETY AND PUBLIC HEALTH: STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION, 2004, at 10 (2004),
available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/transportation/04trafficsafety.pdf.
68 Andrew R. McGarva & Michelle Steiner, Provoked Driver Aggression and Status: A
Field Study, 3 TRANSP. RES. PART F 167 (2000).
69 Id. at 172.
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distract the subject from the actual experimental stimulus. After sev-
eral blocks, the subject's vehicle approached a stop sign, at which
point the researcher hesitated to provide directions about how to pro-
ceed. In the meantime, a confederate driver approached the back of
the vehicle and began honking his horn.70 The experimenter then
measured the subject's response to this aggressive act, which was fol-
lowed by the confederate's vehicle rapidly passing the subject's
vehicle soon after the subject had made a right turn at the stop sign.
McGarva and Steiner found that three-quarters of the subjects
verbalized a negative response to this provocation.71 "In the majority
of cases, angered participants made negative statements about the
other driver, such as 'what a jerk!' or 'this guy behind me is really
ticked off!' as well as some common expletives. '72 This data suggests
that drivers' verbal responses to aggressive driving are often essen-
tially automatic. It is buttressed by survey research finding that siz-
able majorities of drivers admit that while driving alone they complain
aloud about the conduct of their fellow drivers. 73 Sometimes, frus-
trated drivers feel the need to vent by saying something derogatory to
the source of their frustration, and this venting can escalate existing
roadway conflicts. 74
To recap, people are already complaining to themselves about
aggressive drivers. People are complaining to their passengers as well.
And some people are complaining to the government even when not
prompted to do so. If only we could develop a system that harnessed
these complaints without imposing too heavy a burden on drivers, an
enormous amount of additional evidence would be revealed about the
identities of aggressive drivers. If McGarva and Steiner's result is
generalizable, the public goods problem would essentially disappear.75
So let us survey this terrain. HMD placards generate rather
modest per-vehicle call volumes, yet these occasional calls are evi-
70 Id.
71 Id. at 173.
72 Id.
73 Dula, supra note 16, at 6.
74 Jacob L. Cayanus et al., The Relationships Between Driver Anger and Aggressive
Communication Traits, 22 CoMM. RES. REP. 189, 195 (2005).
75 It is possible that drivers are more likely to complain about an aggressive driver if
there is a passenger in the car and that some drivers are uncomfortable muttering to them-
selves. On the other hand, it is also possible that the presence of an authority figure actu-
ally inhibited subjects' willingness to express negative comments about the aggressive
driver. The available data on this question suggests that these conflicting effects roughly
cancel each other out and that motorists are approximately as likely to complain when
driving alone as when driving with others. See Dula, supra note 16, at 6 (reporting survey
finding that 77% of men and 56% of women swear underneath their breath at other
drivers).
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dently sufficient to improve commercial fleets' safety performance
through some combination of deterring aggressive driving and
allowing firms to identify their worst drivers in an expeditious manner.
These placards were apparently successful even when cellular phones
were far less prevalent than they are today, and even though there are
monetary and safety costs associated with reporting a driver's miscon-
duct to an HMD call center. It stands to reason that by lowering the
costs of reporting driver misconduct further, HMD systems could do a
much better job of identifying the worst offenders, even among a
much larger population of drivers. The next Section sketches out such
a system.
D. "How's My Driving?" for Everyone
HMD placards, which began with commercial fleets, are now
migrating toward noncommercial vehicles driven by teens. Georgia
required all state-owned vehicles, with the exception of police cars, to
display HMD placards in June of 2005.76 That same year, Israel
became the first nation to mandate the display of HMD placards on
all commercial vehicles.77 This expansion of HMD raises the ques-
tion: Why stop there? Why not, rather, expand HMD programs to
include all motor vehicles driven in the United States and install in
each vehicle a voice-activated device that facilitates the reporting and
tracking of motorist misconduct? 78
Just as each new passenger vehicle is required to have seat belts,79
the federal government could mandate the installation of HMD plac-
ards or bumper stickers on the front and rear of each passenger
vehicle in the United States. Each placard would provide a unique
identifier for each vehicle, piggybacking on existing license plate num-
bers if appropriate.80 By pressing a button on their dashboards and
speaking into a steering wheel-mounted microphone, motorists would
76 Government Fleet, New Program Allows Public to Report Bad Drivers in Georgia
State Cars, http://www.fleet-central.com/gf/t-inside.cfm?action=news-pick&storylD=
19805 (last visited June 25, 2006).
77 Newman, supra note 48, at 4.
78 As best I can tell, this idea was first proposed publicly in a short post by a pseudony-
mous blogger in 2004. The blog post proposed a driver-to-driver feedback mechanism,
discussed the possible use of the derived data by insurers, and suggested that eliminating
anonymity among drivers would improve motorist performance. The blog post did not
develop the idea in further detail or depth. See Red Herring Blog, How Am I Driving?,
http://blog.redherring.com/MT/archives/main/O00220.html (May 19, 2004, 13:52).
79 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2005).
80 The argument against using existing license plates relates to the accuracy of high-
speed identifications. Motorists sometimes have difficulty identifying out-of-state plates,
which could generate false positives (e.g., a motorist means to complain about Maryland
FGE 344 but instead identifies the plate as Virginia FGE 344). HMD placards on the
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be able to contact a national HMD call center and provide the
vehicle's unique identifier in order to lodge compliments or com-
plaints.81 The law would require the illumination of the placard at
night and mandate its visibility whenever the vehicle was moving.
Law enforcement officials would be able to use the unique identifiers
as well-for example, to gauge instantly whether a particular vehicle's
liability insurance is valid, after accessing a single centralized registry.
For reasons that will be discussed in Part IV, an optimal "How's
My Driving for Everyone" (HMDFE) program might make use of
additional new technologies beyond placards and call centers. A more
expensive system would use in-vehicle GPS technologies or cell phone
triangulation to enable reporting without resort to a unique identifier
(e.g., "Red Toyota behind me, subtract 2 points"). This would lower
the risk of driver distraction and possibly reduce the probability of
erroneous reports resulting from misread license plate numbers or
placards. These higher-tech versions of HMD are described more
fully in Part IV, but for the time being, we can discuss the low-tech
versions currently being managed by Fleetsafe, Driver's Alert, and
other HMD companies for use in commercial fleets, supplemented by
readily available vehicle-integrated cell phone technologies.8 2
Here is how a low-tech version would work: Suppose motorist A
was driving along Interstate 5 and was suddenly cut off by motorist B,
who failed to signal a lane change and abruptly hit the brakes, forcing
motorist A to brake suddenly. Under HMDFE, motorist A could
contact an HMD call center, and say the following words:
"896JXD402, subtract 1 point, driver cut me off without signaling."
Each motorist would be allotted a set number of positive and negative
points that they could distribute to other motorists during a particular
month. These points could be dispensed one at a time or cumula-
tively, for extreme acts of aggression or kindness. The call center
would then convert the call reports into incident data for each vehicle
on the road, possibly using automated voice recognition software. 83
fronts of cars also could be mounted ambulance-style, so as to facilitate reading them in
rearview mirrors.
81 The system could provide a 1-800 number to enable pedestrians, bicycle riders, and
bus passengers to phone in reports as well.
82 See, e.g., R. Lind et al., The Network Vehicle: A Glimpse into the Future of Mobile
Multi-Media, IEEE AEROSPACE & ELECTRONIC SYS. MAG., Sept. 1999, at 27, 27-28
(describing initiative for development of vehicle with integrated web, phone, and
processing functions).
83 Such software already produces reasonably high accuracy levels, and dramatic
improvements in accuracy are expected in the next few years. Scott S. Washburn, Speech
Recognition for On-Site Collection of License Plate Data: Exploratory Application Devel-
opment and Testing, 128 J. TRANSP. ENGINEERING 481, 488 (2002).
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The financial consequences of any particular report would not be sub-
stantial, but the aggregate consequences for a month's worth of
extremely courteous or discourteous driving could be significant.
Vehicle owners would receive a monthly or quarterly invoice from the
HMDFE monitoring center, along with a bill (if negative points on
their driving exceeded positive points) or a check (if positive points
substantially exceeded negative points).84 These would be styled as
civil fines and rewards. 85
Call centers would record the phone number and name of the
complainant, though this information would not be provided to the
motorist whose driving sparked this complaint. HMDFE could be
designed as a revenue-neutral subsidy from bad drivers to good
drivers, or, more likely, revenue collected could be used to offset the
loss of government revenue from speeding tickets and other moving
violations. Reports could also be made available to insurers, who
would be free to use the data to set premiums.
Given the apparent safety improvements associated with HMD
programs, we can conceptualize HMDFE as a vehicular safety device
designed to save lives and dollars. It is a new kind of device, how-
ever-one that harnesses the value of dispersed information that cur-
rently goes to waste. A few readers may be chomping at the bit to
know how HMDFE could cope with false or malicious feedback,
driver distraction costs, and other likely objections. These problems
turn out to be manageable, though readers will have to wait until Part
III to hear how.
II
THE CASE FOR "How's My DRIVING?" FOR EVERYONE
A world without HMDFE is a lot like a world in which students
evaluate their professors' teaching, but no one ever reads or analyzes
84 These fines and rewards would be applied at the vehicle level. As a result, one
spouse's courteous driving of the family vehicle could offset another spouse's inconsiderate
driving of the same vehicle. There is nothing objectionable about such an approach.
Indeed, automobile insurance policies are usually issued to families in multiple-driver
households. Where one spouse suffers for another spouse's driving, or a teenager's driving
of the family car engenders financial penalties for his or her parents, self-help remedies
(such as taking away the teenager's car keys or chastising the husband for his poor driving)
should be prevalent and effective.
85 The civil nature of the system is also essential to avoid conflicting with the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Cf Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346,
1350-52 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that where parking violations were civil offenses, plaintiffs
had no right under Confrontation Clause to cross-examine ticketing officer). As explained
below, HMDFE permits motorists to penalize those who impose substantial costs on them,
with the state acting as a clearinghouse that enforces those penalties (and distributes any
rewards for courteous driving).
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these evaluations. The students are sitting in class each day. They
form opinions about the quality of the teaching. They discuss with
classmates the quality of the teaching without prompting. In such a
world, someone should design a standardized form to solicit feedback
and designate a place where feedback forms can be deposited and
tabulated. No one is saying student evaluations should be the only
measure of teaching performance. But it would be crazy to deny the
value of collecting and analyzing the data at a school where adminis-
trators care about the quality of the educational experience. It is simi-
larly silly to leave professors without the accountability that student
evaluations provide; many professors would still teach conscientiously,
but more than a few would not. Yet in the driving context, the gov-
ernment's policy does nothing to facilitate the collection of this readily
available feedback, and even when motorists call in to complain about
their fellow drivers anyway, the government rarely bothers to investi-
gate to see whether the complaints have merit.
In the remainder of this Part, I argue that the driving context may
be particularly well suited to harnessing the value of dispersed infor-
mation. In the process, I spend a fair amount of time discussing the
criminal law and tort systems, which currently regulate traffic in the
United States. In some ways, it is a shame that these two legal sys-
tems have already occupied this terrain, for HMDFE could prove to
be a more attractive regulatory regime than either one. But the exis-
tence of these two systems hardly eliminates the need for HMDFE.
Rather, we should consider HMDFE as a regime that will allow
society to improve the performance of its tort system substantially and
significantly scale back the resources currently devoted to criminal
traffic enforcement.
A. Putting Scarce Law Enforcement Resources to Better Use
It is largely because of the absence of an effective HMDFE pro-
gram or other effective reputation-tracking regime that society must
assign substantial law enforcement resources to policing the roadways.
In state courts, traffic violations account for 55% of all incoming
cases. 86 Moreover, when traffic citations are issued and motorists
decide to contest their citations, police officers must travel to traffic
court to testify and present evidence, 87 an inefficient use of their time
86 RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2004: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT 59 (2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/2004_Files/
EWSCFull-Report.pdf.
87 Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67
MICH. L. REV. 421, 433-34 (1969).
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that inevitably follows from the criminal nature of many traffic
penalties.88
Needless to say, an HMDFE program would enable the govern-
ment to redirect traffic police to other endeavors where dispersed
information aggregation systems would be less effective. Alterna-
tively, HMDFE would enable state and local governments to shift
resources towards other objectives, such as health care, education, or
infrastructure. That is not to say that an HMDFE program would
allow governments to dispense with traffic police altogether. Some
police would still be necessary to help direct traffic around collision
sites, to ensure that drivers did not disable their vehicles' HMD plac-
ards, to identify and impound cars driven by uninsured drivers, and
perhaps to intervene immediately when an extremely reckless
motorist's behavior triggers substantial numbers of reports from
motorists.
Some tasks currently performed by traffic police, like writing
tickets for motorists who drive at excessive speeds or run red lights,
could be delegated entirely to the HMDFE program. Indeed, when
crashes occur, detailed police reports usually would be unnecessary.
HMDFE communications centers could expect to receive several con-
temporaneous reports from other drivers who witnessed the collision,
which would help resolve blameworthiness in many cases where it
might otherwise be contested. This would also solve the chronic
problem of collision underreporting, which is one of the more severe
information asymmetries currently faced by automobile insurers.
B. Optimizing Monitoring of Roadway Violations
Police officers are probably only a little better than individual
motorists at recognizing traffic violations. Officers have tools like
radar detectors at their disposal, and perhaps somewhat better exper-
tise regarding various traffic rules, but little comparative advantage
beyond that. Whatever advantage individual police officers have over
individual motorists is swamped by two factors: First, the presence of
a marked police car induces motorists to change their driving behavior
88 Police time, of course, is not the only scarce resource. Respect for the police is
scarce as well-too scarce in many urban environments. It is common to see motorists
cooperating in an effort to thwart police enforcement of traffic laws. For example, motor-
ists often flash their high-beam headlights to warn oncoming traffic that a radar gun-toting
traffic patrol officer is hiding behind the next bend. In this context, motorist cooperation
to evade the law may reflect frustration with police enforcement, and that frustration may
have spillover effects in other contexts where the presence of citizen respect for the
police's law enforcement function becomes a life or death matter.
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significantly, so as to comply with the law.89 Second, police cruisers
are dramatically outnumbered by other vehicles on the roadway.90
An effective HMDFE program would essentially turn every vehicle
into an unmarked police car, resulting in substantial reductions in
unlawful or inconsiderate driving behavior.
Beyond their numerical advantage, there are reasons to expect
that the quality of self-policing by motorists would exceed the quality
of governmental policing. As an initial matter, it is worth examining
the problems associated with the present regime. It will then be pos-
sible to explore the ways in which using HMDFE data could improve
the functioning of the three interconnected regimes that currently reg-
ulate driving behavior: the criminal law system, the tort system, and
the automobile insurance market.
1. Suboptimal Police Monitoring
The bread and butter of many state and local police departments
is writing speeding tickets. Published data on traffic citations issued in
the United States, broken down by violation type, is frustratingly rare.
That said, Wisconsin is charmingly meticulous about tracking both
traffic citations and crashes, and its data suggests that citations issued
for speeding dramatically outnumber the citations issued for other
dangerous driving activities. For example, in 2003, Dane County,
Wisconsin issued more than sixty times as many speeding citations as
tailgating citations. 91 Indeed, speeding citations outnumbered the
combined citations issued for tailgating, running stop signs, running
red lights, illegal turns, illegal passing, unsafe backing, unsafe lane
deviations, and inattentive driving by a factor of 6.6.92 Targeting those
who drive at excessive speeds may well be the optimal police strategy
for raising revenue and minimizing traffic contests, as radar guns pro-
vide relatively objective evidence of violations. Yet unless we make a
series of unrealistic assumptions about the differential costs of
89 A.S. Hakkert et al., The Evaluation of Effects on Driver Behavior and Accidents of
Concentrated General Enforcement on Interurban Roads in Israel, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 43, 59-61 (2001).
90 See Cramton, supra note 87, at 435 ("There is so much driving behavior, and it is so
dispersed in time and space, that traffic police, using present methods of surveillance and
enforcement, face a virtually insurmountable task.").
91 Dane County Sheriff's Office, Citations Issued, http://www.danesheriff.coml
03annual/citations.htm (last visited June 25, 2006). A survey study of newly licensed teen-
aged drivers in Northeast states found that, of their first traffic citations, 66% were for
speeding and 10% were for running a red light or stop sign, while failing to buckle up and
making an illegal turn accounted for 4% of citations each. Anne T. McCartt et al., Driving
Experience, Crashes and Traffic Citations of Teenage Beginning Drivers, 35 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 311, 316 (2003).
92 Dane County Sheriff's Office, supra note 91.
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speeding and speed limit enforcement versus other traffic infractions,
it is unlikely that this substantial commitment of law enforcement
resources to policing speed limits is the optimal strategy for improving
road safety.93 The Wisconsin data, along with recent data from other
states, suggests that a failure to yield contributes to more vehicle
crashes than speeding, and tailgating contributes to slightly more acci-
dents as well, although speeding does contribute to marginally more
fatal crashes. 94
As a result of this emphasis on speeding, other traffic laws go
underenforced. Survey data reveals that only 6.4% of motorists who
admitted to running a red light recently have ever been ticketed for
the practice, and that motorists are far more likely to have been
involved in an accident where one motorist ran a red light than they
are to have received a ticket for running a red light.95 Police officers,
in short, seem to be overpolicing the motorist misconduct that is eas-
iest to detect and underpolicing the misconduct that leads to the most
collisions. Perhaps these distortions explain the public's profound
resentment of traffic police, especially among U.S. drivers, who are
more aggravated by traffic police presence than they are by much of
the misconduct that these police are supposed to deter.96 In the minds
93 See John J. Bowen, A Driver Looks at Traffic Enforcement, 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 218, 218 (1966) (noting arbitrariness and ineffectiveness of police
enforcement of speeding laws).
94 See Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Contributing Factors to Aggressive
Driving, http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/motorist/behaviors/aggressive/factors.htm
(last visited June 25, 2006). New York's Department of Motor Vehicles reviewed 2003
crash data and concluded that a failure to yield contributed to 16% of crashes, tailgating
contributed to 14% of crashes, and speeding contributed to 11% of crashes. See Gov-
ernor's Traffic Safety Comm., 2006 Highway Safety Strategic Plan, http://www.nysgtsc.
state.ny.us/hssp-06.htm (last visited June 25, 2006). Oklahoma data from the early 1990s
presents similar findings, though speeding contributed to slightly more crashes than tail-
gating and inattention: Failure to yield contributed to 19% of crashes, speeding contrib-
uted to 12% of crashes, tailgating contributed to 11% of crashes, and inattention
contributed to 9% of crashes. Michael J. Goodman et al., Using Cellular Telephones in
Vehicles: Safe or Unsafe?, 1 TRANSP. HUM. FACTORS 3, 11 tbl.6 (2000).
95 Bryan E. Porter & Thomas D. Berry, A Nationwide Survey of Self-Reported Red
Light Running: Measuring Prevalence, Predictors, and Perceived Consequences, 33 Acci-
DENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 735, 739 (2001); see also Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at
184 (noting that many manifestations of road rage are not illegal); Dula, supra note 16, at 3
(noting that 61% of survey respondents believe that antitailgating laws are inadequately
enforced); Smart Motorist, How's Your Driving?, http://www.smartmotorist.com/dri/
dri.htm (last visited June 25, 2006) (discussing various types of unsafe driving behaviors
that are not proscribed by law or for which relevant traffic laws are underenforced).
96 Timo Lajunen et al., Dimensions of Driver Anger, Aggressive and Highway Code
Violations and Their Mediation by Safety Orientation in UK Drivers, 1 TRANSP. RES. PART
F 107, 113 tbl.2 (1998) (reporting that U.S. respondents were, on average, more annoyed
by police presence on the roads than by illegal driving). This hierarchy was reversed
among British respondents. Id. There is a gender skew to this data, with American men
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of many drivers, the cure for most unlawful driving is worse than the
disease.
An additional shortcoming associated with primary police
enforcement of traffic rules involves the entirely punitive nature of
police regulation. That is to say, police officers focus almost exclu-
sively on punishing poor driving and do nothing to reward good
driving. HMDFE can supplement intrinsic rewards for cooperative
roadway behavior.97
2. Inadequacies of the Tort System
The criminal law system does not drive solo; the tort system also
deters and punishes motorists involved in collisions.98 In a world with
no automobile insurance and no judgment-proof drivers, we might
anticipate that the tort system would deter collisions rather well. Of
course, there would still be costs involved: Litigation is expensive and
slow; these costs make it difficult to deter frequent but low-magnitude
collisions; and trial outcomes are often unpredictable because of
problems of proof and other factors,99 engendering uncertainty that
affects settlements that occur in the shadow of trial outcomes. 100
For related reasons, legal scholars like Bob Ellickson have
hypothesized that within close-knit groups, reputation-based systems
for enforcing social norms may outperform the tort system at
preventing misconduct and resolving disputes about entitlements.101
Ellickson studied the interactions of cattle ranchers in rural
California, a classic close-knit group, and found that in their dealings
with each other they ignored the law of trespass, replacing it with
being noticeably more annoyed than American women by the presence of traffic police,
and American women being noticeably more annoyed than American men by illegal
driving. See Deffenbacher et al., supra note 18, at 88 tbl.4, 88-90.
97 Monetary rewards for cooperative driving should never be so high as to encourage
people to engage in courteous driving as a full-time job. Cf Saul Levmore, Carrots and
Torts, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 203, 208 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000)
(making same point about inadvisability of rewards for those who wear seatbelts, as
opposed to penalties for those who do not). There are too many cars on most urban and
suburban roads as it is.
98 Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 614 (2000).
99 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 602-04 (5th ed. 1998)
(noting factors that can cause error in civil cases).
100 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51 (1996).
101 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167 (1991); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 409 (1997) (discussing subsequent scholarship evaluating
Ellickson's hypothesis).
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neighborliness norms that were more efficient.' 0 2 One can concep-
tualize HMDFE as a use of technology to transform a loose-knit
group into a close-knit group, thereby enhancing the probability that
welfare-maximizing social norms will emerge. 103 We might expect
that just as norms evidently outperform trespass law in regulating
cattle encroachments in rural California, norms might outperform tort
suits in regulating motorist behavior.
There is a critical difference between HMDFE and the type of
norm enforcement regime that Ellickson described: the heightened
importance of the automobile insurance market. In short, an assess-
ment of the tort system for regulating collisions requires an assess-
ment of that market. In the automobile insurance market there are
three fundamental and well-understood problems: adverse selection,
moral hazard, and judgment-proof motorists.10 4 HMDFE has the
potential to ameliorate each of them.
The adverse selection problem stems from information asymme-
tries. Motorists know more about their driving skills and propensities
than insurance companies do, so unsafe drivers may try to take advan-
tage of this asymmetry by obtaining generous insurance policies.
Insurers will have difficulty distinguishing between safe and unsafe
drivers within the ranks of those seeking generous policies, and they
will expend substantial resources trying to exclude the latter while
insuring the former. By providing insurers with far more information
about individual drivers' behavior than they currently have, HMDFE
can reduce this information asymmetry, thereby allowing the insur-
ance market to function much more efficiently. 10 5 The next Section
102 ELLICKSON, supra note 101, at 185-89.
103 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to
Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CH. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (2003) ("Loose-knit groups are clus-
ters of individuals among whom information pertinent to informal control does not circu-
late easily. These loose-knit groups are typically composed of members who do not expect
to be repeat players or who are unable to gather accurate information about another
member's reputation ....").
104 See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Acci-
dent Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 358 (2004) (finding statistical
evidence for existence of moral hazard in automobile insurance market); Steven W. Pottier
& Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics Per-
spective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1686-87 (1994) (discussing adverse selection problem);
S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (discussing
problems created by judgment-proof defendants in insurance markets).
105 Indeed, this information could have second-order benefits as well. The lack of infor-
mation about driving propensities becomes a problem in tort trials, heightening the risk of
an erroneous judgment. If HMDFE scores correlate strongly with accident risks, making
these scores admissible at trial could enhance the efficiency of the tort system. Presently,
however, evidence of past accidents or traffic citations is inadmissible in most jurisdictions,
except in cases where no eyewitnesses to an accident survived. See 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehi-
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will examine the problems created by these information asymmetries
in more detail.
Moral hazard generally arises from the existence of insurance
coverage. When the cost of engaging in a given activity, such as
unsafe driving, is reduced due to insurance compensation, individuals
are more likely to engage in the activity at an increased rate. The
moral hazard problem is unlikely to arise under HMDFE because one
would not expect an insurance market to develop for HMDFE fines.
Just as one cannot insure against parking tickets or moving violations,
we would not expect insurers to view the HMDFE fines system as a
regime that warrants their time. The fines would be too small for
most motorists and the adverse selection problem too great for
insurers. So whereas automobile insurance will reduce drivers' safety
incentives somewhat, HMDFE should not be susceptible to the same
problem.
Finally, HMDFE can address the problem of judgment-proof
defendants. Vehicular accidents are expensive occurrences, easily
destroying thousands of dollars in property even if no injuries occur.
Uninsured motorists may well be judgment-proof with respect to
these amounts. Where injuries do occur, the costs can escalate into
the hundreds of thousands of dollars, an amount that vastly exceeds
the payout limits on most drivers' insurance policies. Many
Americans will be judgment-proof when such figures are involved.
Accidents, in short, are low-probability, high-cost events. HMDFE
fines, by contrast, are high-probability, low-cost events. Many motor-
ists who would be judgment-proof with respect to tort damages, or
who have insufficient income to obtain automobile insurance, will
have sufficient assets to pay HMDFE fines, and the state will be in a
strong position to collect these fines. Thus, HMDFE stands ready to
deter those individuals, especially the uninsured, whose unsafe driving
is insufficiently deterred by the present regime.10 6
3. Reducing Information Asymmetries
As I suggested in the previous Section, obtaining more complete
information about driver conduct could permit insurers to make more
fine-grained decisions about individual drivers' risk profiles and elimi-
nate pernicious actuarial practices. Insurance companies, of course,
do get information about drivers from citation reports, reported colli-
cles § 1079 (2002). The inadmissibility of this information might itself be connected to the
sporadic nature of such data for most drivers, in which case the less sporadic nature of
HMDFE might address these concerns.
106 See infra note 126.
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sions, and other losses, but the data available as a result of these
sources still leaves large gaps in the system. These gaps are filled, in
large measure, by setting group-based premiums, 107 which impose a
collective sanction on all motorists who fit a particular profile. Infor-
mation asymmetries thus raise substantial distributive justice concerns
in the automobile insurance market.
Part of the problem stems from the fact that, for most motorists,
crashes are freakishly rare events. 10 8 As a result, A's past experience
with crashes will not predict A's future likelihood of a crash particu-
larly well. 109 The problem is exacerbated by the substantial underre-
porting of vehicular collisions and systematic inaccuracies in collision
reports, 110 as well as the prevalence of hit-and-run crashes, which
account for approximately twelve percent of all collisions." If
insurers had more data about near misses, future accidents could be
predicted with improved accuracy;" 2 but near misses are rarely
reported. In short, crashes occur rarely enough to render collision his-
tory an insufficient data source for safety evaluations. If crash data
could be supplemented with observational data, insurers could assess
risks with much greater accuracy.11 3
Information asymmetries present particularly daunting challenges
for two high-risk groups: the youngest drivers and the oldest
107 For example, California insurers began relying heavily on insured drivers' zip codes
to set automobile insurance premiums after finding that drivers residing in certain neigh-
borhoods were more likely to be involved in accidents. See Michael Liedtke, Study Hits
Insurance Rate Disparities, CorRA COSTA TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at F4. While insurers are
prohibited by law from charging differentially on the basis of race, a good driver who
moved from a predominantly white neighborhood to a predominantly African-American
neighborhood could expect to pay between $537 and $974 more for annual automobile
insurance premiums. Id.
108 GREY ET AL., supra note 18, at 19.
109 Tijerina, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that past involvement in property damage
crashes is poor predictor of fatal crashes); see also Baojin Wang et al., Safety in the Road
Environment: A Driver Behavioural Response Perspective, 29 TRANSPORTATION 253, 255
(2002) (discussing other problems associated with using past accidents to predict future
accidents).
110 A.E. af Wdhlberg, Some Methodological Deficiencies in Studies on Traffic Accident
Predictors, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 473,474 (2003); M.J. Williams, Validity
of the Traffic Conflicts Technique, 13 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 133, 142 (1981).
Even countries that mandate the reporting of all accidents experience substantial underre-
porting. Jonathan Alsop & John Langley, Under-Reporting of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash
Victims in New Zealand, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 353, 353-54 (2001).
111 In 2004 in Wisconsin, there were 17,176 hit-and-run crashes and 140,265 total
crashes. Wis. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 2004 WISCONSIN TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS 21 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.dot.state.wi.us/safety/motorist/crashfacts.
112 Cf Tijerina, supra note 18, at 9 (describing obstacles to predicting crashes with cur-
rent data).
113 See id. at 5 (explaining predictive advantages of observation data over crash data).
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drivers.1 14 Begin with the former group. Teenagers who have just
received their driver's licenses are particularly accident prone 15 and
unusually likely to tailgate other drivers.1 16 Yet information about
teens' driving abilities is in short supply because they have driven so
few miles, and even poor drivers have received few citations and been
involved in few crashes.' 1 7
The situation with the elderly is in many ways similar. Seniors
have lengthy driving records, but they may see their driving abilities
deteriorate rapidly because of slowed reflexes, worsening eyesight,
dementia, and other health problems. 118 Within a few years, as the
population ages, it is estimated that seniors will cause approximately
one-fourth of all fatal collisions, 119 and they suffer disproportionately
from collisions because of their lessened resiliency to trauma.120
Indeed, per mile driven, older drivers are just as likely to be involved
in accidents as novice drivers. 121 At the same time, seniors who retain
their car keys do not drive very much,122 so information about their
driving abilities may be in short supply. Seniors typically compensate
for their diminished driving abilities by driving more slowly. 123 As a
result, their fading driving skills may not be reflected in increased
traffic citations. Governments, 24 health care providers, and relatives
often fail to recognize cognitive impairments in time or feel reluctant
to take the keys away from a loved one.1 25 Reference to HMD data
114 On the heightened risks faced by very young and very old drivers, see David
Schlundt et al., Reducing Unintentional Injuries on the Nation's Highways: A Literature
Review, 15 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 76, 84-85 (2004).
115 McCartt et al., supra note 91, at 320.
116 M. McDonald et al., Close Following on the Motorway: Initial Findings of an Instru-
mented Vehicle Study § 3.5 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
www.trg.soton.ac.uk/research/platform/VlVforweb.pdf).
117 McCartt et al., supra note 91, at 313, 320.
118 Schlundt et al., supra note 114, at 85; Jane C. Stutts & Jean W. Wilkins, On-Road
Driving Evaluations: A Potential Tool for Helping Older Adults Drive Safely Longer, 34 J.
SAFETY RES. 431, 431 (2003).
119 Margaret F. Brinig et al., Public Choice of Driving Regulations 4 (Univ. of Iowa,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-27, 2005).
120 Schlundt et al., supra note 114, at 85; Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 118, at 431.
121 Marilyn Di Stefano & Wendy Macdonald, Assessment of Older Drivers: Relation-
ships Among On-Road Errors, Medical Conditions, and Test Outcome, 34 J. SAFETY RES.
415, 415 (2003).
122 ROBIN OLSON, INT'L RISK MGMT. INST., INC., SENIOR DRIVING ISSUES: UPCOMING
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 9-10 (2004), http://www.irmi.com/expert/Articles/2004/
Olsonl0.pdf.
123 Id. at 10; Sivak, supra note 6, at 266; see also Di Stefano & Macdonald, supra note
121, at 416 (noting that senior drivers rarely drive in excess of speed limit).
124 Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 118, at 431.
125 Margaret A. Perkinson et al., Driving and Dementia of the Alzheimer Type: Beliefs
and Cessation Strategies Among Stakeholders, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 676, 677 (2005); Victor
G. Valcour et al., Self-Reported Driving, Cognitive Status, and Physician Awareness of Cog-
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on individual teens and seniors would allow insurers to sort the good
drivers from the bad more accurately. 126
C. Controlling Secondary Effects from Aggressive Driving
The foregoing discussion focused on the tangible effects of
reducing aggressive driving, as they relate to driver safety, lives saved,
property damage averted, and traffic obstructed. Quite apart from
these considerations, there are a number of external benefits that
might be associated with the implementation of an HMDFE program
to curtail aggressive driving. These benefits help underscore the value
of HMDFE because they are benefits that the criminal law and tort
systems do an exceedingly poor job of promoting.
1. Everyday Unhappiness
While the costs associated with driver deaths and injuries are
quite substantial, they may well be dwarfed by the sheer unhappiness
associated with commutes to and from work. There is reason to
believe that HMDFE would alleviate much of this unhappiness. By
making drivers accountable, HMDFE could make driving more plea-
surable, and this effect, in and of itself, could result in enormous
improvements in human happiness.
nitive Impairment, 50 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1265, 1266-67 (2002); see also Stutts &
Wilkins, supra note 118, at 431 (noting that seniors often lose self-esteem and personal
freedom when they lose their driving privileges).
126 The suboptimal policing point and the information asymmetries point, in conjunc-
tion, tell us something interesting about optimal law enforcement policy. Classic economic
approaches to crime assume that society should set the penalty for a crime so as to make
the crime's costs (to the criminal) exceed its benefits (to the criminal). See POSNER, supra
note 99, at 242-43; Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 176-77 (1968). If existing penalties prove inadequate, resulting in too
much crime, society can respond by raising the likelihood of apprehension or raising the
penalty for those caught. In theory, the state will be indifferent as between these two
strategies. In practice, given the costs associated with raising the likelihood of detection,
classic law and economics analysis often points in the direction of ramping up penalties
instead of increasing the risk of apprehension. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 78 (2d ed. 1989); Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and
Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 505, 507 (1995). But where we have a vibrant
insurance market in place whose premium-setting strategies piggyback on information gen-
erated by criminal enforcement actions, society should prefer law enforcement strategies
that raise the likelihood of detection. Rare but severe state punishments will leave insurers
in the dark about most of their customers' driving attributes and may wipe out those whose
misdeeds are detected by law enforcement, rendering unlucky wrongdoers indifferent to
the marginal effects of increased insurance premiums. Frequent but measured sanctions
for misconduct, by contrast, will allow insurers to sort among safe and unsafe citizens more
effectively. In those areas, like traffic enforcement, where a robust insurance market exists
and where the state relies on sporadic enforcement and high penalties, the case for creating
a supplemental source of information about citizen misconduct, such as HMDFE, becomes
powerful.
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In recent years, economists have begun exploring the value of
happiness. Experimental work by Daniel Kahneman and coauthors
has prompted research subjects to assess their state of well-being
when performing various daily life tasks.127 The researchers used a
large sample of working women and a day reconstruction method,
whereby the subjects would record diaries at the end of each day
detailing their activities and how they felt while doing them.128 The
study separated out sixteen major life activities and ranked them in
order of how happy people felt doing them. Commuting to work
ranked dead last, noticeably below the two next least popular activi-
ties of housework and working.129 On average, subjects spent 1.6
unhappy hours per day commuting. 130 We know from other research
that the vast majority of this time was spent alone, in their cars.13'
Commuters, then, are a rather miserable lot. Why so glum? This
is not a question that Kahneman and his coauthors asked, but trans-
portation scholars who have studied the question blame rudeness and
aggressive driving. When Porter and Berry surveyed frustrated
drivers for a 2001 paper and asked them to identify the most impor-
tant cause of their frustration, driver rudeness won in a landslide.
Fully 43.5% of respondents stated that "Discourteous drivers" were
the greatest source of frustration, versus 20.8% who identified "Con-
gestion," 12.7% who identified "Drivers not following the law," 4%
who stated "Too many stop lights," and 1% who complained most
about the length of their commute.132 This data echoed findings by
other researchers, 133 and there is psychological literature connecting
127 Kahneman et al., supra note 9, at 1776.
128 For a discussion of some of the methodological challenges in well-being research, see
Carol Graham, The Economics of Happiness, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Steven Durlauf & Larry Blume eds., 2d ed. forthcoming), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/views/papers/graham/2005graham-dict.pdf.
129 Kahneman et al., supra note 9, at 1777 tbl.1. "Intimate relations" easily ranked first
on the happiness score, followed by socializing, relaxing, praying, and eating. Id.
130 Id.
131 Lorna Aldrich, Commuting and the Economic Functions of Small Towns and Places,
12 RURAL DEV. PERSP. 26, 26 (1998); Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters out of Their Cars:
What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141,163-64 (1998); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California's Carpool
Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1235-36 (2000).
132 Porter & Berry, supra note 95, at 738 tbl.2. An additional 18.1% identified "Other"
primary concerns. Id. The data suggests this unhappiness results from a "few bad apples"
problem, as polls indicate that drivers find that most of their fellow motorists "behave with
graciousness and courtesy." Robert F. Blomquist, American "Road Rage": A Scary and
Tangled Cultural-Legal Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV. 17, 24 (2001).
133 See, e.g., Deffenbacker et al., supra note 18, at 85 tbl.1 (finding that illegal driving
behavior annoys research subjects much less than various hostile gestures and discourtesy
on roadway); Lajunen et al., supra note 96, at 110 tbl.1 (finding that among 33 driving
situations, 8 out of 10 most frustrating situations to U.K. motorists were in "Discourtesy"
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road rage and vehicular collisions to clinical depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder.1 34 If we put together the Kahneman
research with the transportation survey research, we very quickly
arrive at the conclusion that aggressive driving is the source of sub-
stantial disutility that Americans encounter in their day-to-day lives.
Aggressive driving does cause collisions,135 but the happiness research
shows that even if aggressive driving did not cause any additional acci-
dents, it would still be a substantial social ill worth addressing through
public policy interventions.
2. Expressive Benefits
Standard approaches to criminal law assume that enforcing the
law is an undesirable activity that the state's agents (police officers)
must be paid to do. The limited data available from HMD programs,
along with the data from governmental pilot programs designed to
elicit information about aggressive driving, suggests that there is a
substantial portion of the civilian population that is willing to "tattle"
on unsafe and discourteous drivers, even if doing so entails some
financial costs and produces no financial benefits.
The current approach to traffic regulation ignores the "consumer
surplus" that could result if we let lay people express their opinions
about fellow drivers, punishing the bad drivers and rewarding the
good ones. These expressive benefits ought to be an important part of
the calculus, and not only because expressing these opinions might
alleviate the frustration that sometimes engenders aggressive driving
or road rage. Such expression seems to produce genuine welfare gains
for the drivers who currently feel impotent and stifled under the status
quo and whose complaints finally would be taken seriously under an
HMDFE regime. 136 The effects of law enforcement on the enforcers,
in short, can be just as important as the effects on enforcees.
or "Hostile gestures" categories, including "Someone cuts in and takes the parking spot
you have been waiting for," "Someone is driving very close to your rear bumper,"
"Someone cuts in right in front of you on the motorway," "Someone backs out right in
front of you without looking," "At night someone is driving right behind you with bright
lights on," "Someone makes an obscene gesture toward you about your driving," and
"Someone speeds up when you try to pass them"); Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at
429 (noting survey results in which category including road rage, aggressive driving, and
other drivers was rated as single greatest safety concern by 39% of poll respondents, versus
11% who said drunk driving).
134 Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at 187 (summarizing research finding that connection).
135 See, e.g., Deffenbacker et al., supra note 18, at 84.
136 Cf. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAV-
IORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 25-26 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (describing benefits
obtained by people who sacrifice their own economic well-being to punish someone who
has behaved "unfairly" in ultimatum game experiment). Frustrated drivers often express
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III
OBJECTIONS TO "How's My DRIVING?" FOR EVERYONE
Having made out what I believe to be a rather strong affirmative
case for HMDFE, I shall now discuss some of the serious objections
that no doubt have occurred to readers. While several of these objec-
tions have merit, I shall suggest that, even in combination, they do not
offset the advantages detailed above. Moreover, a few of the argu-
ments that at first glance look like objections ultimately may
strengthen the case for implementing HMDFE.
A. Inaccurate and Malicious Feedback
Because an HMDFE system is only as good as the feedback it
receives, we must examine whether we can expect such feedback to be
accurate. We can identify two quite different problems here: First,
deliberately inaccurate (positive or negative) feedback, and second,
feedback provided in good faith that turns out to be mistaken. The
former issue presents greater challenges, and should be treated at
length.
It is rather easy to imagine scenarios whereby HMDFE systems
could be abused. Let us bring the most troublesome scenarios to the
forefront: Suppose a racist driver cruises around town, assigning neg-
ative feedback to African-American or Asian-American motorists
who are driving in an acceptable manner. Or imagine that HMDFE
feedback is used to harass an unpopular individual for reasons having
nothing to do with her driving performance. There is no doubt that
HMDFE might invite this type of distasteful conduct, along with occa-
sional inaccurate positive feedback. That said, there are reasons to
believe that such misconduct will be rare, that technology can amelio-
rate such problems when they do arise, and that the problems associ-
ated with biased drivers would be no worse than the problems created
by biased cops in the current police-based traffic enforcement regime.
Commercial fleet drivers sometimes object to HMD programs
based on a fear that callers will phone in false reports.137 Yet it turns
out that inaccurate reporting for commercial fleet drivers is relatively
uncommon in HMD programs. Anonymous reports to HMD call cen-
ters generally are not permitted, although the identity of callers is
their frustration and anger by honking their horns. This is an unsatisfying response, in that
it imposes few costs on the source of the driver's frustration, and it also engenders substan-
tial noise pollution externalities.
137 Banstetter, supra note 26.
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never reported to the offending drivers. 138 A small minority of drivers
prompt the majority of calls, and after these drivers are identified for
retraining or discharge, fleet accident rates drop sharply. 139 This evi-
dence cannot be reconciled easily with the hypothesis that many
HMD calls are motivated by racial animus, harassment, or pranks. To
be sure, drivers of passenger vehicles might be more susceptible to
malicious reports thanks to the greater proximity of the driver to his
or her rear bumper, and women and minorities may be under-
represented in the ranks of commercial drivers. Still, while one might
expect to see more prejudiced feedback in HMDFE than HMD for
commercial vehicles, there is little reason to expect a plethora of false
reports in the HMDFE context.
False feedback is also a concern in online reputation regimes, and
software developers, as well as economists, have developed algorithms
to detect deliberately false feedback. Essentially, the idea is that the
system discounts outlier scores-instances in which a buyer gives neg-
ative feedback on an overwhelmingly well-rated merchant or vice
versa. 140 There is a cost to eliminating these outliers, in that a good
merchant sometimes behaves badly, just as a good driver sometimes
makes mistakes.141 That said, in an environment like eBay, where
most users are behaving honestly, algorithms designed to weed out
likely false reports are welfare enhancing. 142 As long as reputation
systems elicit a lot of user feedback, isolating and ignoring problem-
atic feedback is reasonably straightforward. 143 Moreover, it is worth
138 See Driver's Alert, supra note 31; Safety Alert, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.safetyalert.com/faq.asp#serviceswork (last visited June 25, 2006) (claiming that more
than 99% of all calls logged by HMD monitoring company represent valid complaints).
139 KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, § 3.12; Emerson, supra note 27.
140 Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against
Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior, 2000 PROC. 2ND ACM CONF. ON ELEC-
TRONIC COM. 150, 153.
141 Id. at 155; cf. Bin Yu & Munindar P. Singh, A Social Mechanism in Reputation Man-
agement in Electronic Communities, in COOPERATION INFORMATION AGENTS IV: THE
FUTURE OF INFORMATION AGENTS IN CYBERSPACE 154, 164 (Matthias Klusch & Larry
Kerschberg eds., 2000) (justifying reliance on assumption of mostly honest graders of elec-
tronic ratings model that does not discount all outlying scoring as being no worse than
"democratic rule in human societies").
142 Sonja Buchegger & Jean-Yves Le Boudec, The Effect of Rumor Spreading in Repu-
tation Systems for Multiple Ad-Hoc Networks § 7 (March 2003) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://icapeople.epf1.ch/sbuchegg/bucheggerLO3A.pdf).
143 The dynamic at play here is connected to the Condorcet Jury Theorem:
[S]uppose that people are answering the same question with two possible
answers, one false and one true, and that the average probability that each
voter will answer correctly exceeds 50%. The Jury Theorem holds that the
probability of a correct answer, by a majority of the group, increases toward
certainty as the size of the group increases.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 972-73.
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emphasizing that online reputation-tracking technologies are still in
their infancy, and dramatic improvements to the eBay system for
identifying false feedback can be expected in the years ahead. 144
These algorithms could be adapted to the HMDFE regime quite
readily. Indeed, by gaining more information about drivers than eBay
has about buyers and sellers, the system could police racist and other
forms of problematic feedback quite effectively. For example, if an
HMDFE system knows the race of various drivers, it can discount or
even ignore the ratings of white drivers who routinely assign suspi-
ciously high levels of negative feedback to African-American drivers.
Similarly, if the system knows where people work, study, and live, it
can discount or ignore feedback among people who live in the same
household, attend the same high school, or who work for the same
company.1 45 Moreover, the system can discount repeat evaluations
among the same drivers. In an urban environment, if one driver or a
small group of drivers are repeatedly giving positive or negative feed-
back to a particular driver, there is probably something fishy going on,
and the system can ignore these suspicious rankings. 146 In other
words, so long as we are willing to seed an HMDFE system with infor-
mation about characteristics that might form the basis for inaccurate
feedback, we can develop algorithms to help address the problems
associated with deliberate inaccuracy.
In some respects, HMDFE would be better equipped to deal with
malicious feedback than the online reputation sites. Online reputa-
tion sites suffer somewhat because users with poor reputations can
always "flush" their existing identities and start over with a blank
slate.1 47 HMDFE would use each participant's unique identifier
(vehicle VIN numbers and/or driver's license numbers) to prevent
these sorts of evasions. Since the state already tracks vehicle owner-
ship, even acquiring a new vehicle would not be a viable "flushing"
144 Miller et al., supra note 57, at 27.
145 Collusive ratings are a problem for online feedback systems generally, though eBay
has been able to keep this problem at tolerable (albeit nonzero) levels to date.
Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of
Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1407, 1419 (2003).
146 Scholars who study reputation networks have identified this "ganging up" problem
and shown how it can be solved if participants use unique identifier numbers. Jay
Schneider et al., Disseminating Trust Information in Wearable Communities, 4 PERS.
TECHS. 245, 247 (2000). In an urban environment, unique identifiers are present in the
form of vehicle identification numbers; one driver should not expect to encounter another
driver repeatedly, so the system can ignore a second, third, or fourth instance of feedback
by driver A about driver B.
147 Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputation in an Internet Auction
Market, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 633, 640 (2002).
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strategy.148 A well-designed HMDFE system, in short, ought to be
able to ameliorate the problems with malicious feedback. Like
Wikipedia, eBay, and open source projects, it will not be able to elimi-
nate malicious information entirely. But algorithms that take advan-
tage of driver information from motorist reports, preexisting
government records, and third-party databases should be able to
meet, if not exceed, the accuracy and usefulness of Wikipedia's voting
system, eBay's fraud patrols, and open source filtering mechanisms. 149
One additional point is worth emphasizing on this score: An
HMDFE regime with occasional inaccurate reporting should not be
compared to an ideal system of police traffic enforcement. Police
enforcement in the real world is hardly first best. Police officers are
prone to the same biases as other people, 150 and training to correct for
those biases is imperfect. Delegating traffic enforcement to drivers
148 The system would not distinguish between multiple household members who share
the same vehicle. See supra note 84 (noting that households already pay for family auto-
mobile insurance policies). Indeed, household-level reputational tracking might optimally
constrain bad driving behavior. The aggressive driving husband might be marginally
deterred if he can secretly pay HMD-related civil fines based on his own behavior, but
substantially deterred if he knows his wife will be informed of, and be required to pay for,
his discourteous driving. Similarly, the careless-driving teenager might fear that too many
negative driving reports triggered during the evenings when she borrowed the family car
will cause her parents to revoke her driving privileges. In short, household-level peer pres-
sure to alter driving habits can enhance roadway safety.
149 The solid performance of various "peer assessment" metrics, such as "360 degree"
feedback, in business and education settings provides further support for the proposition
that drivers' feedback about fellow motorists' behavior will be informative. See, e.g., Peter
A. Bamberger et al., Peer Assessment, Individual Performance, and Contribution to Group
Processes: The Impact of Rater Anonymity, 30 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 344, 367-68 (2005)
(finding evidence that peer assessment improved group performance in manufacturing
facility); Phil Davies, Computerized Peer Assessment, 37 INNOVATIONS EDUC. & TRAINING
INT'L 346, 353-54 (2000) (noting benefits of peer assessment of student reports and essays).
150 See, e.g., Matthew Petrocelli et al., Conflict Theory and Racial Profiling: An Empir-
ical Analysis of Police Traffic Stop Data, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 8 (2003) (finding that police
officers are much more likely to conduct searches of African-American motorists than
other motorists, and that success rates of searches of African-Americans are therefore dis-
proportionately low); Jeff Rojek et al., The Influence of Driver's Race on Traffic Stops in
Missouri, 7 PoLICE Q. 126, 143-44 (2004) (concluding that African-Americans and
Hispanics "attract more attention on the nation's roadways than do Whites"). A widely
cited paper by Knowles, Persico, and Todd argued against the existence of widespread
racial bias in police searches of motorists in Maryland. See John Knowles, Nicola Persico
& Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL.
ECON. 203 (2001). But more recent work by Knowles has backed away from that claim
after analyzing Missouri data that suggests the existence of racial bias, especially against
Hispanics, in traffic stop-based searches. See Rub6n Hernindez-Murillo & John Knowles,
Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV.
959, 981-84 (2004).
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themselves is a nice way of ensuring that traffic enforcers reflect the
demographics of the surrounding communities.151
What about feedback that the caller believes to be true, but that
turns out to be inaccurate? On the whole, the experience of compa-
nies using HMD programs and the experimental research on driving
attitudes suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio from HMDFE would
be comfortingly high. Again, the more feedback is generated, the less
difference an occasional good-faith mistake will make, and the more
reliably outlier reports can be identified.
That said, there is some evidence to suggest that individuals may
rely on stereotypes to generate their opinions of what contributed to a
particular collision. After presenting research subjects with written
descriptions of accidents and asking them to assign blame, a study by
Lawrence and Richardson found that gender and car type significantly
affected these judgments. 152 More specifically, male drivers were
judged to be more aggressive (a stereotype that is consistent with
other data),1 53 and female drivers were judged to be more careless (a
stereotype that is not supported by other data). 154 Similarly, BMW
drivers were judged more likely to have behaved aggressively than
drivers of tiny Smartcars (a stereotype that is consistent with some,
but not all, of the other data).155 In laboratory settings, then, people
are influenced by external factors in designating other drivers as
blameworthy.
In real-world settings, where aggressive driving often provokes
visceral responses, these biases tend to fade into the background. For
example, the intensity of driver reactions and the length of their
verbal response did not differ when they were confronted by honking
151 Elizabeth Joh recognizes the same problem of suboptimal or biased police enforce-
ment of traffic laws, and she suggests a different remedy-greater automation and less
human judgment in traffic law enforcement. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing:
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with
the New York University Law Review).
152 Claire Lawrence & Jane Richardson, Gender-Based Judgments of Traffic Violations:
The Moderating Influence of Car Type, 35 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1755, 1768-69 (2005).
153 Id. at 1771; Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 432.
154 Lawrence & Richardson, supra note 152, at 1771.
155 Id. at 1769. On the accuracy of vehicle-based stereotypes, compare Barbara Krahd
& Ilka Fenske, Predicting Aggressive Driving Behavior: The Role of Macho Personality,
Age, and Power of Car, 28 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 21, 26-27 (2002), finding that drivers of
high-performance cars rated higher on aggressive driving scale, and Reginald G. Smart et
al., Road Rage Experience and Behavior: Vehicle, Exposure, and Driver Factors, 5 TRAFFIC
INJ. PREVENTION 343, 345 (2004), finding that drivers of high-performance vehicles were
more likely to report having engaged in road rage than drivers of other vehicles, but
finding no significant differences between SUVs, minivans, trucks, and cars, with Shinar &
Compton, supra note 17, at 433, which finds no correlation between vehicle status and
propensity to drive aggressively.
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low-status or high-status vehicles on the roadway, although research
subjects did accelerate more quickly to get away from honking drivers
of low-status vehicles. 56 This suggests that HMDFE data will not
perfectly reflect what actually happens on the roadways, but it should
reflect it closely enough for the. system to operate reasonably well.
Indeed, other feedback systems, such as eBay's, should be susceptible
to some of the same biases, based on sellers' existing feedback
profiles,157 yet those feedback systems are generally hailed as major
successes. Moreover, keeping in mind the relevant comparison is
again useful here. Police officers will hold many of the same subcon-
scious biases, 158 and these biases may be more problematic in the
officer context because resource constraints require high levels of
selective enforcement on the roadways.
B. Distracted Driving
By enabling drivers to complain about others' misconduct, an
HMDFE regime might distract them from their first priority, which is
to operate a motor vehicle safely. 159 In the last few years, as cell
phones have proliferated, policymakers and researchers have devoted
increased attention to the risks associated with driver distraction.
Some of these concerns have prompted state legislatures to require
drivers to use hands-free cell phone devices, although no U.S. jurisdic-
tion has banned calling while driving altogether. 60 The best available
evidence suggests that conversing on a cell phone increases collision
risk marginally, but perhaps not enough to warrant regulation in light
156 McGarva & Steiner, supra note 68, at 176. This response may well be rational, as the
driver of a low-status vehicle is more likely to be uninsured, so drivers should expect that
the out-of-pocket costs associated with a collision with a low-status vehicle would be
higher. A much earlier study found that people honk more quickly at the driver who has
failed to proceed after a red light turns to green when they are behind a low-status vehicle
than when they are behind a high-status vehicle. Anthony N. Doob & Alan E. Gross,
Status of Frustrator As an Inhibitor of Horn-Honking Responses, 76 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 213,
215-16 (1968).
157 Scholars studying eBay reputation ratings have discussed a rich-get-richer phenom-
enon, whereby a vendor's existing strong reputation "anchors" subsequent feedback about
that vendor, rendering this subsequent feedback marginally more positive than it would
otherwise be. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 12-15; see also Alex Geisinger,
Nothing but Fear Itself: A Social-Psychological Model of Stigma Harm and Its Legal Impli-
cations, 76 NEB. L. REV. 452, 482 (1997) (noting that stigmatization can result in anchoring
effects, causing people to overestimate risks posed by stigmatized actor).
158 See supra note 150.
159 Cf Smart et al., supra note 18, at 49 (arguing that increasing drivers' ability to use
communications devices may distract drivers from safe driving).
160 SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 67, at 10.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
November 20061
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the productivity gained from in-vehicle use of communications
devices. 161
An impressive study by Wilson, Fang, Wiggins and Cooper com-
bined observation of cell phone use on public roadways with research
into the driving records and collision histories of those seen using cell
phones versus those seen not using cell phones. Their study found
that drivers "observed using a cell phone had a risk of an at-fault crash
1.16 times greater than did drivers not using cell phones. 1 62 The rela-
tionship between observed cell phone use and collisions was not statis-
tically significant for males, though it was significant for females. 163
By contrast, having previously incurred a citation for aggressive
driving multiplied the likelihood of collision involvement by 1.84 for
all drivers and by 1.76 for males.164 The driver's age also played an
important role. Compared to being 45 or older, being 16-24 enhanced
the likelihood of collision involvement by factors of 1.74 for all drivers
and 1.99 for males, and being 25-34 multiplied the likelihood of colli-
sion involvement by factors of 1.53 for all drivers and 1.6 for males.165
For all drivers, the increased risk associated with being a cell phone
user was essentially equal to the increased risk associated with being
between the ages of 35 and 44.166 Wilson and coauthors did note that
cell phone use was associated with other high-risk behaviors that
enhanced collision risk, but a multivariate regression analysis revealed
that the role of cell phone use in enhancing collision risk was "rela-
tively minor. ' 167 Equally important, the very high collision risk asso-
ciated with aggressive driving violations makes it plausible that any
increased collision risk associated with encouraging HMD cell phone
reports would be dwarfed by the decreased collision risk associated
with detecting and deterring aggressive driving.1 68
161 For a cost-benefit analysis, see Joshua T. Cohen & John D. Graham, A Revised Eco-
nomic Analysis of Restrictions on the Use of Cell Phones While Driving, 23 RISK ANALYSIS
5 (2003):
[T]he central estimate for the net benefits of a ban on cell phone use while
driving was close to zero and hence .. the value of preventing crashes caused
by cell phone use while driving is approximately equal to the value of the calls
that would be eliminated by a ban.
Id. at 14.
162 Jean Wilson et al., Collision and Violation Involvement of Drivers Who Use Cellular
Telephones, 4 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 45, 49 (2003).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 49 tbls.3 & 4.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 49 tbl.3.
167 Id. at 51.
168 It is plausible that the correlation between crashes and aggressive driving violations
is so high, at least in part, because aggressive driving violations are so rarely detected. That
is to say, we can expect that the drivers who have received citations will tend to be the most
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Another comprehensive study, this one of Virginia traffic acci-
dents, analyzed the various causes of crash-related driver distrac-
tion.169 The researchers found that cell phone use did contribute to
some traffic accidents, but that it ranked well below looking at
scenery, rubbernecking, and eating or drinking.170 Cell phone use
ranked slightly above adjusting vehicle controls as a contributor to
traffic accidents. 171 On the whole, the research findings suggested that
cell phone use does cause some accidents, but far fewer accidents than
other manifestations of driver distraction that currently go unregu-
lated. Moreover, if it is true that HMDFE would decrease collisions
by deterring aggressive driving and helping to remove the worst
drivers from the roads, then this would generate substantial benefits
from a driver distraction perspective, since rubbernecking is such a
significant contributor to crashes: Fewer accidents leads to less dis-
traction, which results in fewer accidents, and so on.
There are studies that reach very different conclusions about the
risks of cell phone use while driving. These studies suggest that cell
phone usage may result in moderate, or even major, increases in colli-
sion risk. If these studies are accurate, even quick calls to HMD cen-
ters could result in measurable increases in collisions nationwide.
Though some of these studies do not control for the observed correla-
tion between cell phone use and other risky driving behaviors, 72 a
real note of caution is appropriate here in light of the mixed evidence.
aggressive drivers, as opposed to the moderately aggressive drivers. This underreporting
problem therefore could result in an overestimation of the risks associated with garden-
variety aggressive driving.
169 ANDREA L. GLAZE & JAMES M. ELLIS, VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., PILOT STUDY
OF DISTRACTED DRIVERS (2003).
170 Id. at 13-14.
171 Id. at 14.
172 John Violanti's study is widely invoked for its claim that cell phone use is associated
with substantial increases in traffic fatalities, but his study did not control for the afore-
mentioned correlation. See John M. Violanti, Cellular Phones and Fatal Traffic Collisions,
30 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 519, 519, 523 (1998); see also Goodman et al.,
supra note 94, at 24-25 (showing increased risk of collision when drivers use cellular
phones but acknowledging that results may differ in real-world situations). A better and
more recent study found that cell phone use impaired response times when drivers had to
stop suddenly to avoid running a red light. P.A. Hancock et a]., The Distraction Effects of
Phone Use During a Crucial Driving Maneuver, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
501, 510 (2003). And an even more recent simulation study found similar impairments
from conversing on cell phones. See David L. Strayer et al., A Comparison of the Cell
Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver 6 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies,
Working Paper No. 04-13, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=570222. There is
reason to be cautious about the results from simulation studies. In the real world, drivers
often slow down when talking on the cell phone as a means of compensating for the divi-
sion of their attention. Goodman et al., supra note 94, at 22. Furthermore, participants in
a simulator exercise know that in the event of a "crash" or other negative outcome, they
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Given the conflicting evidence concerning the risks of cell phone
use in vehicles, three points are worth making. The first point is that
voice recognition and other technologies stand poised to decrease the
impairments associated with cell phone use while driving. 173 Research
has suggested that two aspects of cell phone use are particularly dan-
gerous while driving: manipulating a phone (e.g., dialing numbers
while driving); and engaging in intense conversations that demand a
great deal of attention, focus, and computational brainpower. 174
These risk factors can be reduced through the use of one-touch
dialing, speakerphones, and automated verbal templates for leaving
feedback.
The second point is that even if cell phone use does increase acci-
dent risk, the incremental increase in cell phone use resulting from the
implementation of an HMDFE program would be rather small. After
all, motorists will spend far more time talking to friends, relatives, cli-
ents, and service providers than they will spend talking to HMD oper-
ators, even in a 1-800-based HMDFE system. Moreover, reports
called into an HMD system can be used to identify those callers whose
use of in-vehicle communications adversely affects their driving
performance.
The third point is the key: As the studies referenced above make
plain, cell phone use is hardly the most significant source of driver
distraction. Indeed, other research suggests that the frustration asso-
ciated with seeing other drivers behave rudely or aggressively is very
substantial and that this frustration is itself a source of distraction.175
will not be injured, nor will there be serious financial repercussions. One way to reconcile
the findings of the simulation studies with the observational studies is to suggest that
people are able to multitask more effectively when the stakes are very high. Id. at 25. For
further discussion of some of the conflicting evidence and methodological challenges, see
id. at 25-38, and D. Haigney & S.J. Westerman, Mobile (Cellular) Phone Use and Driving:
A Critical Review of Research Methodology, 44 ERGONOMICS 132 (2001).
173 See Mike Schneider & Sara Kiesler, Calling While Driving: Effects of Providing
Remote Traffic Context, in CHI 2005: PAPERS 561, 567-68 (2005) (arguing that providing
telephone users who call drivers with real-time information about traffic conditions faced
by driver reduces accident risk); Washburn, supra note 83, at 481 (examining speech recog-
nition as method for collecting data from drivers).
174 David L. Strayer & William A. Johnston, Driven to Distraction: Dual-Task Studies of
Simulated Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Telephone, 12 PSYCHOL. Sci. 462, 462-66
(2001).
175 See Deffenbacher et al., supra note 18, at 84 (noting connection between driver
anger and collisions); Clifford Nass et al., Improving Automotive Safety by Pairing Driver
Emotion and Car Voice Emotion, in CHI 2005: LATE BREAKING RESULTS 1973, 1974-76
(2005) (presenting interesting experimental data that examines how drivers' emotional
state influences their attention to road); Paul C. Rosenblatt, Grieving While Driving, 28
DEATH STUD. 679, 684-85 (2004) (expressing concern about potential for grieving drivers
to be distracted by their grief, thereby exposing them to enhanced risk of accidents); supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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So while an HMDFE system would increase the distraction associated
with reporting others' misconduct, it promises to alleviate the distrac-
tion that arises from fuming about another's driving and either feeling
powerless to do anything about it or contemplating some means of
retaliating against the offending driver. 176 And, of course, when retal-
iation does occur, via light flashing, honking, gesturing, and the like,
further distraction may ensue, affecting the initial offender, the frus-
trated retaliator, and anyone nearby on the road.
In short, to determine the net driver distraction effects of
HMDFE, we must balance the incremental danger of distraction
caused by calling against the incremental danger of frustration caused
by the inability to report bad driving. Seen in that light, it may be that
the net effect of an HMDFE system would actually be a decrease in
driver distraction, notwithstanding the increased use of telecommuni-
cations devices required to log complaints.
C. Why Not Fully Automated Enforcement?
In recent years, traffic planners have become increasingly enam-
ored with automated means for improving traffic flow and safety. Car
manufacturers and engineering faculties are researching and devel-
oping various technologies to those ends. For example, cars are being
developed that will use radar to detect when a driver is tailgating
another vehicle too closely;177 intersections are being fitted with cam-
eras to catch motorists who drive through red lights; 178 and insurance
companies, as well as rental car companies and commercial fleets, are
testing the use of GPS to monitor speeding by individual drivers. 179
Many of these approaches hold promise, and research into these pro-
grams can proceed alongside the rollout of HMDFE.180 Indeed,
because automated systems might provide an objective means of cor-
roborating some of the information reported to HMD centers, these
systems could enable researchers to spot-check the accuracy of the
information aggregated via HMDFE.
The case for HMDFE over automated enforcement is the case for
human judgment and context sensitivity. Driving in excess of the
speed limit is efficient in some contexts, whereas in other contexts
176 Cf Brewer, supra note 13, at 55 (noting that in some cases, distracting frustrated
drivers can be advantageous because it lowers their propensity to retaliate aggressively).
177 Smart et al., supra note 18, at 48.
178 SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 67, at 22.
179 Sheryl Jean, Checking Your Driving: Progressive Insurance Testing Chip that Tracks
Speed, Distance, ST. PAUL PIONEER-PRESS, Aug. 10, 2004, at C3.
180 See SAVAGE ET AL., supra note 67, at 22 (finding that use of automated red-light
cameras at intersections resulted in reductions in injury crashes of between 7% and 29% at
those intersections).
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(such as on an icy road), driving at the speed limit exposes other
drivers to substantial risks.' 8 ' Indeed, on a clear and sunny day, when
most people are driving seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per
hour zone, driving at the speed limit is more dangerous than driving
seventy miles per hour.182 Running a red light at three o'clock in the
morning at an obviously deserted intersection is sensible; ticketing a
driver for engaging in such conduct serves little purpose other than to
prompt exasperation with the traffic laws. Some forms of bad driving,
such as excessive lane changing or a refusal to let another motorist
merge, are difficult to detect via automated enforcement. Other
harmful driving habits, like excessive braking or darting into a parking
spot that another motorist is plainly waiting for, are not generally
unlawful. Finally, automated enforcement offers none of the expres-
sive benefits associated with HMDFE, whereby the regime encour-
ages measured and anonymous retaliation for driver misconduct,
thereby diverting frustrated motorists from more excessive and pro-
vocative retaliation.
One comparative advantage of HMDFE over automated traffic
enforcement tracks the advantages of distributed enforcement over
enforcement by traffic police. It is based on a preference for stan-
dards and norms over rules and laws. There is a standard-like excep-
tion to virtually every "rule" of the road. Americans drive on the
right, except when the right lane is obstructed, in which case they try
to move into the left lane when it is safe to do so. Americans must not
run red lights, except when it is necessary to do so in order to avoid an
accident or to get out of the way of an emergency vehicle. HMDFE is,
in short, like a jury system for traffic regulation, where existing laws
and rules are modified by social expectations and aspirations to form a
body of law that is used to reward the cooperators and punish the
deviants. 183
181 Cramton, supra note 87, at 436.
182 David Navon, The Paradox of Driving Speed: Two Adverse Effects on Highway Acci-
dent Rate, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 361, 366 (2003).
183 None of this means that a world of HMDFE is a world where all traffic laws get
repealed. Many traffic laws, such as the convention that motorists in the United States
drive on the right and pass on the left, establish efficient focal points in coordination and
mixed-motive games. These laws should remain on the books to serve as a backstop for
driving norms. Other traffic laws will be useful in determining liability ex post where a
traffic collision has occurred, particularly if there were not many motorists nearby to wit-
ness the collision, or if there is strong reason to expect that the witnesses who happened to
be nearby were biased in a systematic way.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 81:1699
HOW'S MY DRIVING?
D. Information Privacy Interests
Information privacy advocates occasionally sound the alarm
about existing automated enforcement regimes, where rental car or
insurance companies monitor individual drivers' behavior through the
use of GPS or other surveillance technologies. 18 4 Especially when dis-
cussions turn to sharing this information with the government, these
same privacy advocates are quick to invoke George Orwell's 1984.185
I teach and write about information privacy law, 186 but I have
difficulty understanding the appeal of these kinds of claims. I can
comprehend the individual privacy interest in travel destinations and
why twenty-four-hour GPS monitoring of a vehicle might intrude on a
legitimate privacy interest. After all, twenty-four-hour monitoring of
that sort would allow the monitor to infer a great deal about the
driver's intimate associations, medical information, and political activ-
ities. But we can and should remedy these concerns by forbidding
monitoring entities from piecing together information about drivers'
travel patterns and by protecting vigilantly the HMDFE databases
that would contain information that reveals these patterns. As long as
appropriate data security and data transfer protections are imple-
mented, crucial privacy interests can be vindicated without compro-
mising the objectives of the HMDFE program.187
The information privacy interests that motorists would assert to
prevent governments or insurers from discovering, say, their speed or
braking distance, are not weighty. There is nothing private about road
speed: It can be discerned with substantial accuracy by a police
officer, a bystander holding a radar gun, or a motorist driving behind
the car being monitored. There is no connection between road speed,
or propensity to tailgate, and intimate conduct of any kind.188 Nor do
184 Bob Gritzinger, Under the Hood, with Big Brother, AUTOWEEK, Nov. 8, 2004, at 30;
Jean, supra note 179.
185 E.g., Gritzinger, supra note 184, at 30.
186 Sometimes sensibly. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Social Networks]. Some-
times less sensibly. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Bounda-
ries of Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2005).
187 A helpful signpost here is Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), in which the Supreme
Court held that New York's creation of a vast database to track individual patients' use of
prescription drugs did not violate the constitutional right to information privacy absent a
showing "that the security provisions of the statute will be administered improperly." Id.
at 601.
188 I have argued elsewhere that as a general rule, those bits of information that relate to
intimate conduct present the strongest case for privacy protection. Strahilevitz, Social Net-
works, supra note 186, at 923-24, 930-31; cf Joh, supra note 151 (manuscript at 32-35)
(concluding that enhanced use of vehicle-based data recorders for traffic enforcement pur-
poses would not violate constitutional or statutory privacy rights).
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
November 2006]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
these bits of information implicate our interests in facilitating the
development of personalities, affect sensitive medical information, or
undermine valuable confidential relationships. Privacy is a means, not
an end.189 We should protect privacy if, and only if, doing so pro-
motes social welfare. It is difficult to identify any benefit of roadway
anonymity with respect to information about drivers' road speed or
tendencies to weave through traffic and cut off other motorists.
Driving usually takes place in very public places. As a result, it is
appropriate that the courts have not been receptive to arguments that
drivers maintain reasonable expectations of privacy with respect to
where their vehicles are traveling. 190 Almost everything that could be
learned through the implementation of an HMDFE regime could be
learned through multiplying the present number of traffic police by a
factor of ten. Yet virtually no one contends that increasing the
number of police officers patrolling the streets would violate indi-
vidual privacy rights. 19 1 HMDFE makes drivers accountable for con-
duct that is public but that remains obscure solely because of resource
constraints. The only time an individual has a reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to her driving is when no one else is around. In
those settings, HMDFE protects the privacy of her conduct, because
there would be no motorists, bystanders, or law enforcement officials
to report any good or bad driving.
Existing privacy norms might foreclose HMDFE implementation,
but the foregoing analysis suggests that privacy advocates should
avoid a knee-jerk response and ask themselves: "How does motorist
obscurity promote social welfare?" There are plenty of privacy causes
worth defending in contemporary society. In my view, motorist
obscurity is simply not one of them.
189 See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978) (sug-
gesting that privacy is intermediate good, i.e. input in "the production of ... utility or
welfare").
190 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another.").
191 One paper that comes close to taking this position is Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video
Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World
that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1349 (2004). Blitz suggests that while
sporadic police surveillance of public streets would not violate the Fourth Amendment,
complete surveillance of these same streets would. Id. at 1374-77, 1443-47. Blitz's argu-
ment is admirably ambitious, but in the end I do not believe it persuades. The Fourth
Amendment has not been read to impose a resource constraint on society's expenditures
on law enforcement, nor should the Constitution dictate a maximum level of law enforce-
ment resources that can be devoted to policing conduct in public spaces. The possibility of
retreating onto private or communal property provides adequate protection for intimate
conduct and association, as well as the possibility of chance encounters among strangers.
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E. Due Process
There is, of course, a final doctrinal issue to be considered: the
Due Process Clause. Because the federal government would be depu-
tizing its motorists and enabling any of them to sanction fellow motor-
ists, the program would be unprecedented. The state often
encourages private citizens to blow the whistle about others' miscon-
duct, via qui tam statutes, whistleblower protections, and signs
encouraging motorists to "Be an HOV Hero: Report Carpool
Cheats." But these complaints typically trigger government investiga-
tions where the accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence.
At the same time, there are numerous settings in which the gov-
ernment delegates significant responsibility to the community in
making high-stakes decisions about individuals. Does an advertising
campaign infringe a registered trademark? It depends on the extent
of associated consumer confusion. Will vice laws be enforced? The
answer often depends on whether citizens of the affected neighbor-
hoods demand enforcement. Will an individual be convicted of a
crime in the absence of forensic evidence linking him to the crime
scene? The testimony of eye witnesses probably will prove decisive.
The interesting question raised by HMDFE is: What happens when
the stakes of a sanction are much lower and the costs of permitting
each motorist to challenge any sanction in court or administrative pro-
ceedings would be prohibitive? The stakes associated with ordinary
HMDFE reports might be low enough to warrant a relaxation of the
procedural hurdles that are quite sensibly required in the context of
criminal prosecutions and civil trials.
To answer the due process question, courts would most likely
employ the general balancing approach set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge.192 Mathews suggests that bare-bones procedures may be
constitutionally sufficient if they result in reasonably reliable decisions
about sufficiently low-stakes matters.1 93 Applying this framework, the
Seventh Circuit has rejected a due process challenge to municipal
regimes in which motorists were penalized with civil parking fines and
the city had a policy of not requiring parking officers to attend civil
hearings on the grounds that "the benefits of requiring the police
officer to appear at every hearing [were] unlikely to exceed the
costs. ' 194 In the court's view, the right to cross-examine officers or
attack their credibility surely could increase the accuracy of the civil
fines system, but not by nearly enough to warrant the added
192 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
193 Id. at 341-49.
194 Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351-53 (7th Cir. 1997).
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expense. 195 This analysis suggests that a great deal will turn on the
magnitude of the inaccurate feedback problem identified above.196 If
feedback is abundant and unreliable feedback can be effectively
filtered out, then the lack of any opportunity to challenge the feed-
back should not doom HMDFE.
Indeed, an HMDFE regime offers safeguards currently absent in
most law enforcement contexts. With HMDFE it would be easy to
track whether a particular feedback provider's information has a
racially disparate impact or often diverges from the feedback provided
by motorists who witnessed the same events. Such irregularities could
be identified at the moment dubious feedback is provided, rather than
festering until lawyers think to scrutinize them in plea-bargain negoti-
ations or trial cross-examinations. Moreover, HMDFE feedback usu-
ally would be provided in real time, before memories fade, and before
police investigators have the opportunity to pressure or coach com-
plaining witnesses.
There is little reason to require lawyers, cross-examination, or
post-deprivation hearings under the Mathews due process framework,
and plenty of reason to be intrigued by the potential for HMDFE-
style technologies to correct injustices at the lowest possible cost. Of
course, it is lawyers who will apply the Mathews framework, and they
might well regard their absence as a cause for concern, even were they
convinced that HMDFE was reliable and that civil fines would not be
severe for most drivers.
Supposing due process concerns persist, they could be addressed
in at least two ways. The first would be to alter the nature of the
system so that the government is merely collecting the data and not
imposing any fines; instead it would merely provide the information to
insurance providers, who could use it or ignore it as they saw fit. Such
a regime would ameliorate due process concerns because the govern-
ment itself would not be depriving anyone of a liberty or property
interest. Rather, the government would be acting in a publisher's
capacity, which it already does when it gathers information about indi-
195 The D.C. Circuit has embraced similar reasoning:
Absent an explicit provision in the statute that requires individualized claims
adjudications for overpayment assessments against providers, the private
interest at stake is easily outweighed by the government interest in minimizing
administrative burdens; in light of the fairly low risk of error so long as the
extrapolation is made from a representative sample and is statistically signifi-
cant, the government interest predominates [under the Mathews v. Eldridge
framework].
Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 137-58.
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viduals and responds to Freedom of Information Act requests for that
information. 197
A second response would be to expand procedural safeguards in
an HMDFE regime. We could build in technologies that would help
spot-check the accuracy of driver-provided feedback and provide for
streamlined post-deprivation hearings where physical evidence could
be introduced to assess feedback veracity. Of course, permitting these
opportunities to challenge inaccurate feedback would make the
system more expensive and cumbersome. Instructively, however,
online reputation-tracking sites have adopted divergent policies on
this score, with some providing more "due process" for aggrieved
members and others providing no avenues for challenging inaccurate
feedback.1 98 HMDFE similarly could provide motorists with lots of
process or very little. Although the version I propose here would not
entitle motorists to a hearing at which they could challenge purport-
edly inaccurate feedback, Part IV of this Article discusses sensible
variations that would offer aggrieved motorists far more procedural
protections.
F. Shouldn't We Let the Market Implement HMD on Its Own?
In order to justify a mandatory regulatory intervention, it is usu-
ally appropriate to identify a market failure that needs fixing. At the
outset, it is worth recalling that the absence of an effective market on
the roadway is the source of the aggressive driving problem in the first
place. We need not develop a comprehensive reputation-tracking
system in instances where vendors who behave poorly suffer the
repercussions. If a Starbucks barista is rude, customers can complain
to the shop manager, and since the manager has an incentive to keep
197 Suppose the food inspectors of a municipality track the number of times citizens call
in to complain about food poisoning after eating at particular restaurants. If the city then
distributed this raw data to a local newspaper that disseminated the information to the
public at large, a restaurant owner who saw his or her business dry up would have no due
process claim against the city. Nor would he have a defamation claim, as long as the city
accurately reported the calls that citizens had phoned in. By publishing the data, the city
would not be affirming the veracity of any particular complaint.
198 For example, eBay is resistant to policing the accuracy of feedback. See eBay,
Resolving Feedback Disputes, http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/feedback-disputes.html
(last visited Aug. 16, 2006) ("eBay will remove individual feedback comments only in very
exceptional circumstances, when they violate specific policies."). Amazon.com, by con-
trast, provides next to every user review a link that appears to facilitate greater scrutiny of
its content by Amazon, stating: "If you find this content inappropriate and think it should
be removed from the Amazon.com site, let us know by clicking the button below. This
information will be sent to Amazon.com and we will take appropriate action."
Amazon.com, Report Tags As Inappropriate, http://www.amazon.com/gp/tagging/report-
this.html?ie=UTF8&tag=l (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
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his customers happy, he will train the employee to behave better or
fire her if training seems futile. In the driving context, there is no
market that binds one driver to another, and this absence justifies gov-
ernmental involvement, both through the traffic police and tort
system and through an HMDFE system using distributed
enforcement.
That said, there are major players in the driving market who in
some respects resemble our Starbucks managers. Automobile insur-
ance firms, in theory, could discipline poor drivers whose policies they
underwrite, but at present there is no institution that allows a frus-
trated motorist to identify which insurance company to call in order to
complain about the pickup truck driver who nearly rear-ended her.
Insurance companies are certainly free to make it worth their cus-
tomers' while to participate in an HMD scheme, and given the man-
date in all fifty states that every motorist carry liability insurance, one
might expect to see high levels of participation in a purely voluntary
HMD scheme based on incentives provided by insurance companies.
Indeed, if participation in a voluntary HMD system were widespread,
then an insurance company might sensibly "assume the worst" about a
customer who refused to participate, raising a red flag that would war-
rant a denial of coverage or sharply increased premiums. So why is
government intervention appropriate here?
The first answer is that there are millions of drivers who do not
have automobile insurance, 199 and a voluntary HMD regime would
not incorporate these drivers into the system. HMDFE, by contrast,
would apply to all drivers. Furthermore, it could address the general
problem of uninsured motorists. Normally, it is costly for the govern-
ment to determine which uninsured motorists have stopped driving
and which of them flout the law. HMDFE would give the government
reliable information about which cars are on the roads, thereby sub-
stantially reducing the marginal costs of identifying and targeting
uninsured motorists.200 Police could quickly identify and target those
vehicles that were reportedly being driven, but which did not show up
as carrying liability insurance in a centralized HMD database. 201
199 Dan Walters, Legislators Spent a Lot of Time Deciding Who Can Legally Drive,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 31, 2005, at A3 (noting that in California alone, 15% of motorists,
representing 3.5 million drivers, lack automobile insurance).
200 This advantage may dissipate in the coming years as the government obtains more
complete information about individual drivers through E-ZPass data or similar sources.
201 The United Kingdom has experimented successfully with real-time accessible
databases of insured motorists that can be accessed by specially equipped patrol vehicles to
identify and impound uninsured vehicles based on their license plate numbers. Stephen
Womack, Flash! Now Cameras Snare the Uninsured: Police Step Up the Fight to Force 1.2
Million Motorists off the Road for Driving Without Cover, MAIL ON SUNDAY (U.K.), Aug.
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The second answer is that a nonuniversal system would mitigate
the expressive benefits associated with HMDFE. More precisely,
HMDFE taps into norms of reciprocity: Motorist A tolerates the pos-
sibility that other drivers may punish his own poor driving by virtue of
his own ability to punish others' poor driving in exchange.20 2 Given
the strong possibility that the least considerate drivers will be most
likely to opt out of a voluntary HMD program, these expressive bene-
fits will be lost, and these holes in system coverage might invite road
rage and aggressive retaliation against those who have opted out,
while simultaneously undermining support for the system as a whole.
The third answer is that there are negative externalities associ-
ated with aggressive or inappropriate driving that are not borne by
individual insurance companies or individual drivers. Automobile
insurance companies do internalize many of the harms of increased
collisions, but they do not internalize the health and psychological
costs associated with frustrated and angry drivers, the rising vehicle
and fossil fuel costs associated with increased expenditures on bigger
and safer cars, and the law enforcement costs associated with policing
traffic violations. These are costs borne by the public at large and by
the state, and they may explain the failure of insurance companies to
encourage the expansion of HMD beyond commercial fleets. More-
over, while individual insurance companies would benefit from having
feedback about their own customers, they would not benefit (much)
from enabling their customers to leave feedback about other insur-
ance companies' customers. Hence, the provision of feedback-
enabling technologies in vehicles would be plagued by a minor
tragedy of the commons, which might well prevent insurers from
encouraging the installation of these devices in vehicles driven by
their customers.
Finally, although the case for mandatory HMDFE rests on exter-
nalities-related arguments, paternalistic rationales may provide fur-
ther support. HMDFE may help individuals drive in ways that better
reflect their own aspirations, though not their own practices. When it
comes to driving, commercial and noncommercial drivers alike
deviate rather substantially from what a rational actor model would
predict, with cognitive errors and emotional responses adversely
28, 2005, at 18. Texas is developing a similar system. Ty Meighan, System a Real-Time
Check of Insurance: Nearly a Quarter of Texas Drivers Don't Have It, DPS Reports,
CORPUS CHRIST] CALLER-TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at B4.
202 On reciprocity, see Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 74 (2003) (noting that "the willingness of individ-
uals to make costly contributions to collective goods is highly conditional on their percep-
tion that others are willing to do so").
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affecting driver performance.20 3 The predominant government atti-
tude toward seat belts in the 1970s was that individuals could decide
for themselves whether they wished to use these safety devices. Most
consumers did buckle up, but thousands refused to do so and died as a
consequence. If studies of HMD in the commercial fleet context
translate into the passenger vehicle context, then the argument for
HMDFE would look a lot like the argument for "click it or ticket"
laws. Forcing the universal use of a safety device saves enough lives to
warrant the associated restrictions on individual liberty.
On balance, then, it seems that HMD would be most effective if
implemented universally, and the government's ability to mandate
participation makes it the obvious vessel for implementing HMDFE.
That said, a voluntary HMD program may be worth implementing if
political obstacles prevent the enactment of HMDFE.
G. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The ultimate test will be whether HMDFE withstands cost-
benefit analysis. The preceding sections have identified the relative
costs and benefits, but it will be helpful to recount them briefly here.
Of course, with a new and admittedly radical proposal like this one, it
will be impossible to generate reliable estimates of the actual dollar
figures of either the costs or benefits.
With respect to benefits, we would be aggregating the value of
collisions avoided, including lives saved, injuries prevented, work
interruptions avoided, litigation and insurance administration costs
eliminated, and property damage averted. Data on HMD for com-
mercial vehicles suggests that collision reductions could range from
20% to 50%.204 A recent economic analysis found that the mean
social cost of a fatal traffic accident in the developed world was
approximately $1.5 million in 1999.205 Other recent estimates suggest
203 See Otto Anker Nielsen, Behavioral Responses to Road Pricing Schemes: Descrip-
tion of the Danish AKTA Experiment, 8 INTELLIGENT TRANSP. Sys. 233, 250 (2004) (noting
that motorists have poor sense of average and marginal costs of driving); Sivak, supra note
6, at 263-68 (giving examples of various instances in which driving behavior reflects
bounded rationality); Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Probability Matching and the Law: A
New Behavioral Challenge to Law and Economics 11-16 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual
Meetings, Paper No. 39, 2004) (reporting results from parking experiment in which sub-
jects chose whether to park illegally, not on basis of welfare maximization, but on basis of
probability matching); Annich Maincent et al., Truck Driver's Behaviour and Rational
Driving Assistance 10-12 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.psychology.
nottingham.ac.uk/IAAPdivl3/ICTTP2004papers2/ITSMaincent.pdf) (finding that many
commercial truck drivers fail to optimize combination of speed and fuel consumption).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
205 Anna Trawdn et al., International Comparison of Costs of a Fatal Casualty of Road
Accidents in 1990 and 1999, 34 ACCiDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 323, 330 (2002).
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that fatal traffic accidents alone cost the United States 2.2% of its
gross domestic product (GDP). 20 6 Using the Bureau of Economic
Analysis's 2005 estimate of $12.76 trillion for GDP,20 7 the cost of such
accidents in the United States equaled $280.73 billion. A 20% reduc-
tion in fatal crashes therefore would save society upwards of $56 bil-
lion per year, based on these conservative, back-of-the-envelope
calculations. Other benefits identified in this Article would include
cost savings on law enforcement, enhanced efficiencies from reduced
information asymmetries in the insurance market, substantial
improvements in everyday driver happiness, and significant expressive
benefits from enabling drivers to sanction those who endanger or frus-
trate fellow motorists.
On the costs side, we should include the costs associated with
establishing an HMDFE system, the costs of malicious and inaccurate
feedback, and the costs incurred by those motorists who would suffer
disutility from having their driver behavior adversely evaluated by
peers. There would also be some driver distraction costs associated
with HMDFE. However, these distraction costs would be offset (per-
haps fully) by a reduction in two forms of driver distraction: distrac-
tion caused by an inability to sanction an aggressive driver in a
measured way, and distraction caused by rubbernecking.
In short, the costs and benefits of HMDFE are presently indeter-
minate and will remain so until a pilot program is implemented or
further experimental studies are conducted. That said, it seems
entirely plausible that the benefits associated with HMDFE will out-
weigh the associated costs, perhaps by a wide margin.
IV
VARIATIONS
My goal in this Article has been to construct a conceptual case for
distributed enforcement of traffic norms. I have no intention of
hashing out all the details of what the ideal HMDFE system would
look like. After all, for the reasons identified above, implementing
any HMDFE regime would induce a great many changes in the way
we think about traffic regulation, and different portfolios of changes
are likely to appeal to different readers. Along the same lines, any
HMDFE regime necessarily confronts some basic trade-offs, and the
ways in which policymakers weigh those trade-offs should affect the
206 Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE L.
REV. 1301, 1309 (2002).
207 See Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth
Quarter 2005 (Final) (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchives/
2006/gdp4O5f.pdf.
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parameters of such a system. For example, there will be a clear trade-
off between the costs of an HMDFE system and its accuracy. So
policymakers in jurisdictions facing major resource constraints might
opt for a less accurate system, and policymakers in jurisdictions where
collisions impose particularly serious costs on society may be willing
to stomach a higher-tech version of HMDFE. This Part identifies the
more important trade-offs and evaluates possible variations on the
HMDFE regime.
A. High-Tech Reporting
The rudimentary version of HMDFE relies on technologies that
already exist and have proven themselves in the context of voluntary
HMD programs for commercial fleets: stickers or placards on the
backs of vehicles encouraging motorists to report misconduct via their
cell phones. But placards and cell phones should strike us as stone-
age technologies in 2006. Requiring motorists to see a placard or
license plate clearly, pay for cell phone calls, and report good or bad
behavior to an operator will surely deter reporting and thereby make
the system less effective. Therefore, technologies that can reduce
reporting costs seem particularly valuable in an HMDFE regime.
A slightly higher-tech version of the system would lower the cost
of reporting by installing dedicated communications technologies
within vehicles for the sole purpose of contacting HMD call centers.
Motorists could contact these call centers by pressing a button on their
steering wheels and by commenting on others' driving using a built-in
microphone. We can dub this version the "OnStar" approach. 20 8
However, with a little bit of ambition, we can imagine a much
more effective HMDFE system, using technologies that already exist
but that have not been adapted for driver feedback monitoring pur-
poses. For example, we could mandate the installation of GPS
trackers in every vehicle or use cell phone tower triangulation to iden-
tify the locations of particular motorists. Such positional data would
allow drivers to make reports even if they could not see a placard.
Hence, a driver might contact the call center to report, "Blue convert-
ible behind me, add three points, kindly let me merge." Relying on
voice recognition software to instantaneously digitize the report,20 9
the HMD call center would then use GPS to discover the location of
the caller's vehicle as well as the unique identifier belonging to the
vehicle immediately behind it. Once the center verified that the
208 See generally OnStar, http://www.onstar.com (last visited June 19, 2006).
209 See Washburn, supra note 83, at 481 (discussing real-time speech recognition
technology).
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vehicle was a blue convertible, it would assign the vehicle three
driving points. If the vehicle behind the driver at that moment was no
longer a blue convertible, the automated call center could locate any
blue convertible within a few car lengths of the caller's vehicle and
assign that car the points in question. If there was no bluish convert-
ible anywhere near the caller's vehicle, the system could flag the
report as probably inaccurate.
In principle, such a system also could be designed to facilitate
reporting by pedestrians, bicyclists, and bus passengers, particularly as
GPS-enabled handheld devices become increasingly common in the
coming years. Analyzing the various engineering challenges inherent
in developing such a system is well outside my zone of expertise. I will
instead refer interested readers to some of the more illuminating
papers in the burgeoning literatures on the use of GPS devices in
driving,210 wireless communications systems in vehicles,211 and voice
recognition devices in automobiles. 21 2
A different type of high-tech reporting can address the aforemen-
tioned inaccurate feedback problem as well. It would be relatively
easy to mount digital video cameras on the front and rear of all partic-
ipating vehicles, and in-car computers could upload the buffered video
footage from the time period immediately preceding a call to an
HMDFE call center. The images captured by these cameras could
provide verification of negative or positive feedback reported to the
HMDFE call centers.213 It would be inefficient for the state to ana-
210 See, e.g., Youjing Cui & Shuzhi Sam Ge, Autonomous Vehicle Positioning with GPS
in Urban Canyon Environments, 19 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION
15 (2003); Jean-Pierre Hubaux et al., The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, May-June 2004, at 49; Nielsen, supra note 203, at 237; Yonglong
Xu, Development of Transport Telematics in Europe, 4 GEOINFORMATICA 179, 186-90
(2000).
211 See, e.g., Michel Frenkiel et al., Clip Card: Smart Card Based Traffic Tickets, in
ELEC RONIC GOVERNMENT 313 (Roland Traunmuller & Klaus Lenk eds., 2002); Sojen
Pradhan, Mobile Commerce in the Automobile Industry, 2003 INT'L CONF. ON INFO. TECH.:
COMPUTERS & COMM. 276; Xu, supra note 210, at 190-95.
212 See, e.g., John H.L. Hansen et al., Robust Speech Processing for In-Vehicle Voice
Navigation Systems, 4 INT'L CONGRESS ON ACOUSTICS 2603 (2004); Marvin C. McCallum
et al., Speech Recognition and In-Vehicle Telematics Devices: Potential Reductions in Driver
Distraction, 7 INT'L J. SPEECH TECH. 25 (2004); Washburn, supra note 83. McCallum and
coauthors found that the use of voice recognition technologies to control a PDA did not
affect driver performance in speed maintenance or lane tracking tasks. It did lower
response times in emergency situations, although in these settings voice activated systems
outperformed systems requiring manual manipulation. McCallum et al., supra, at 30-31.
213 Cf Gregory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551, 560 (2001)
("[New Jersey] has instituted a campaign to install video cameras on all patrol cars so that
traffic stops can be recorded and monitored."). Such audits of HMD reports could then be
used to weight the feedback provided by individual callers. For example, if a motorist's
complaints were routinely substantiated by data from cameras, then the HMD system
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lyze each reported incident independently to see if it was supported by
what the cameras picked up. But spot checks to ensure the accuracy
of feedback reports could be accomplished quite easily, and in cases
involving high stakes (i.e., where one driver assigns a large number of
positive or negative points), evidence from these cameras would go a
long way toward ensuring system accuracy. And if due process con-
cerns require that drivers be afforded opportunities for post-depriva-
tion hearings under an HMDFE regime,2 14 then data from these
cameras could substantially lower the costs and improve the reliability
of such hearings.
A high-tech version of HMDFE will be more costly than a low-
tech version, but the savings associated with a higher-tech version
could warrant the added expenditures, particularly since automobile
industry analysts expect the proliferation of vehicle-based speech rec-
ognition and GPS tracking technologies in years to come anyway.
B. Decreased Anonymity for Reporters
At first glance it may seem strange that an article that began by
bemoaning the ills associated with anonymous driving has proposed a
system of semianonymous feedback. A system where call centers
know the identity of a caller but drivers who spark a complaint do not
seems to strike the best balance among several objectives that are at
times in tension with one another. Caller anonymity will incentivize
people to report others' misconduct, discourage retaliation, and pro-
mote accurate feedback (to the extent that a fear of retaliation would
discourage people from providing feedback). On the other hand,
caller anonymity would decrease transparency for the subjects of com-
plaints and make it more difficult to correct maliciously false negative
reports, which will diminish the accuracy of feedback somewhat.
What underlies my tentative conclusion that complete anonymity
vis-A-vis targets of driving feedback is optimal? In part, it is a judg-
ment that nonanonymous feedback on eBay has manifested a
Pollyanna effect, in that participants have an incentive to provide posi-
tive feedback about transaction partners in order to increase the like-
lihood that their transaction partners will in turn provide favorable
feedback about them.215 Because of this concern about retaliation,
some participants who are not entirely satisfied with the performance
of a transaction partner leave unduly positive feedback, and this mar-
could weight that motorist's future feedback more heavily. If, by contrast, a motorist's
complaints were routinely unsubstantiated, then the system could discount that motorist's
subsequent feedback. For elaboration, see infra Part IV.D.
214 See supra Part III.E.
215 Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 4, at 4-5.
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ginally erodes the system's ability to distinguish good vendors from
excellent ones.
In the driving context, we can expect to see a similar effect if
anonymity is not protected. Namely, A may forego providing nega-
tive feedback about B's driving based on a concern that B will retal-
iate against him by providing negative feedback about A. This
concern could be mitigated, somewhat, by a time lag in revelation,
such that A would be long gone by the time B learned of A's feed-
back. But this feature would not ameliorate the concern entirely in a
low-tech version of HMDFE, since B might have made note of A's
unique identifier if he thought there was some risk that B's driving
would provoke a negative response from A. Because of these con-
cerns about retaliation, too few people might supply the public good
that driving feedback represents.
This concern is even more pronounced in the aggressive driving
context than in the eBay context for two reasons: First, the likelihood
of violent retaliation is higher in the driving context. Second, with
aggressive drivers, we are talking about a population that is prone to
aggressive and retaliatory acts in many other facets of their lives.216
Many aggressive drivers, in short, will tend to behave vindictively in
an environment where negative feedback hits them in their pocket-
books, and for that reason protecting anonymity to some degree
seems essential.
Of course, callers should not be entitled to remain anonymous
with respect to HMD call centers, even though this lack of anonymity
will no doubt deter some callers from providing feedback. If callers
are permitted to leave completely anonymous reports, then HMD
centers can do nothing to ensure that a few drivers are not providing
too much feedback, that some drivers are not targeting other drivers
with repeated negative or positive feedback, and that racial or other
biases are not prompting particular callers to leave inaccurate feed-
back.217 System integrity, in short, demands that callers be account-
able to the government, although not directly to the targets of their
reports.
C. Points Only, or Comments as Well?
One appealing aspect of an HMD system is its potential to edu-
cate drivers who are oblivious of their shortcomings. 218 Experimental
216 Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 268.
217 Cf Bamberger et al., supra note 149, at 369-70 (concluding that nonanonymous peer
assessment may outperform anonymous peer assessment in workplace setting).
218 Many drivers fall into this category. Cf Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and
More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981) (finding
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interventions in the driving context suggest that when drivers are pro-
vided with feedback regarding safety performance from passengers in
the vehicle, they are responsive to this feedback and drive more safely
in the future.219 In the commercial fleet setting, fleet operators obtain
the details of incident reports and use these details to train drivers in
how to avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.
This raises the design question of whether HMDFE feedback
should include substantive comments about driving, or whether the
system should just report final results like "add two points" or "sub-
tract one point" for a particular incident. There is no obvious answer
to this question. Comments can educate or inflame. Some comments
will be perceived by the targets of these complaints to be so
unfounded that they may erode support for the HMDFE scheme. On
the other hand, some motorists may be frustrated by the absence of
substantive feedback, especially if they routinely receive low marks
from fellow drivers but cannot discern the basis for that pattern.
Indeed, substantive feedback on eBay seems successful, and helps
interested participants identify the reasoning behind negative or posi-
tive vendor reviews.
In the driving context, some feedback is particularly valued and
valuable. Drivers seem receptive toward feedback about their driving
received from people with perceived expertise. More precisely, com-
mercial fleet drivers surveyed were quite welcoming of performance
feedback from their company's safety managers and supervisors, as
well as feedback from fellow drivers of commercial fleet vehicles. 220
They were not receptive, by contrast, to feedback from drivers of pas-
senger vehicles.221 Let us assume this principal finding is broadly
generalizable. Is there a way to raise the quality of substantive feed-
back in an HMDFE system by identifying the relevant experts?
The ideal HMDFE system would collect substantive feedback
from all drivers, but only report that feedback from those drivers with
the most favorable HMD scores. In other words, the drivers who
received a relatively large number of positive points and a relatively
small number of negative points from fellow motorists would be free
to transmit substantive feedback (e.g., "changes lanes too frequently")
that 88% of Americans and 77% of Swedes surveyed believed themselves to be safer than
median driver in their countries, and that 93% of Americans and 69% of Swedes believed
they were more skillful than median driver).
219 Karl A. Hutton et al., Modifying Driver Behaviour with Passenger Feedback, 4
TRANSP. RES. PART F 257, 266-68 (2002).
220 Yueng-Hsiang Huang et al., Feedback by Technology: Attitudes and Opinions of
Truck Drivers, 8 TRANSP. RES. PART F 277, 291 (2005).
221 Id.
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to other drivers, whereas average and below-average drivers would
only have the outcomes of their feedback (e.g., "add one point"; "sub-
tract two points") reported to others. Under such a system, those
drivers ranking in the top quartile of feedback rankings would be enti-
tled to leave substantive feedback that other drivers could hear; all
other drivers would be muzzled. As a result, when drivers did receive
substantive feedback about their driving, it would be from drivers
whom the system identified as possessing some expertise about how to
drive skillfully and safely.
There are additional benefits associated with such a regime. For
example, it is likely that the drivers ranked in the top quartile will be
relatively courteous in their interactions with fellow motorists. Cour-
teous drivers seem likely to provide relatively constructive feedback
to other motorists, so limiting this substantive feedback should help
ensure that motorists rarely hear inflammatory, expletive-laced feed-
back.222 Moreover, it is possible that motorists will value the expres-
sive benefits associated with being a highly-ranked driver. If so,
enabling the top-ranked drivers to leave verbal feedback will create
greater incentives for motorists to drive in a manner that pleases their
anonymous peers.
Finally, collecting substantive comments in addition to points
could serve an important educational function for all drivers. Once all
the HMDFE feedback is collected, it would be relatively easy for the
state to publish data on which driving behaviors sparked the most
compliments and complaints. Motorists might be surprised to see, say,
that tailgating annoyed many drivers and that rolling stops did not, or
that stealing parking spots prompted very intense reactions, whereas
moderate speeding prompted only mild annoyance. Motorists who
perused this data could adjust their own driving behaviors accordingly
in subsequent periods. The publication of such data might alleviate
some due-process-oriented concerns about citizen notice of the rules
of the road. Moreover, it would enable jurisdictions and insurers to
monitor changes in driving norms over time.
The primary benefit, however, of using information aggregation
technologies in this context would be the creation of a parallel traffic
code, one that approximated actual motorists' preferences as closely
as possible. HMDFE thus emerges as a system that is capable not
only of enforcing existing norms, but also of articulating emerging
social norms. These norms can then be publicized to members of the
222 GREY ET AL., supra note 18, at 49 (describing drivers with fewest lifetime accidents
as being unusually relaxed and coolheaded when confronted by others' rude driving).
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public, perhaps hastening the process by which they become efficient
focal points for human behavior.22 3
Having described the trees, a few words about the forest are in
order. The foregoing analysis suggests the potential for HMDFE to
produce, as a by-product, a universal and comprehensive driving code
that closely reflects the preferences of American drivers and is
capable of rapidly changing in response to preference shifts. We
might conceptualize such a code as the product of hyperdemocratic
decisionmaking. It certainly makes other forms of direct democracy,
like the initiative process, look republican and clunky in comparison.
Unlike any other law on the books, such a law would provide citizens
with precise notice of the rules of the road as enforced. That is some-
thing no other sort of law presently does.
D. One Car, One Vote?
Up to this point, the analysis has assumed that the feedback
structure would permit something like cumulative voting. Under such
a scheme, each driver might be allotted fifteen positive points and fif-
teen negative points each month, which could be assigned to thirty
different vehicles or two different vehicles, depending on the intensity
of the driver's reaction to another drivers' conduct. All along, the dis-
cussion has presupposed something along the lines of one car, one
vote.
Alternative feedback weighting systems might well be preferable.
For example, the system probably should allot more points to motor-
ists who spend more of their time on the roadways, and miles driven
would be an adequate proxy for time spent driving. Similarly, motor-
ists who receive very positive marks from their peers could be allotted
extra points each month, or they could have their points weighted
more heavily than those who receive middling or poor feedback. 224
Indeed, the system might well ignore the feedback provided by the
worst drivers, since those drivers could be penalizing driving behavior
that the vast majority of motorists regard as safe and cooperative. 225
223 On the effect of focal points and the law's expressive effects, see Richard H.
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000), and
Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compli-
ance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87 (2005).
224 Cf. Yu & Singh, supra note 141, at 158 (advocating implementation of this system for
online reputation-tracking systems).
225 There is, of course, some circularity built into a system that allots extra votes to the
top-ranked drivers and fewer votes to the bottom-ranked drivers. This circularity is easily
avoided, however, if rankings at a fixed point (say, the beginning of each month or year)
are used to weight votes. Alternatively, the system can rely on raw scores (i.e., the results
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Even if the HMDFE system adhered to a one car, one vote prin-
ciple, individual insurance companies could be more flexible in devi-
ating from that formula. If the raw data from HMDFE is shared with
insurers, then insurance companies could test various voting models
and try to better predict risks. Actuaries thus could function as lab
technicians, constantly tinkering with new models for weighing feed-
back, and the government eventually could piggyback on this work,
adopting the weighting algorithms that proved most successful in the
private insurance market.
This Part has discussed some of the variations on HMDFE and
some of the design issues that would arise during implementation.
The analysis reveals how much the regime can accomplish and how
much depends on the details. Many details of the program, such as
the optimal voting scheme or the optimal level of technology, seem
open to reasoned debate. Many other variations could be imagined as
well, but I will spare the reader extended discussions because of space
considerations. 26
V
"How's My DRIVING?" FOR EVERYTHING?
In a standard thought piece, a concluding section discusses the
various ways in which the model proposed might be extended to other
settings. There is some awkwardness in writing that section of this
Article; after all, my proposal itself extends two related ideas-com-
mercial fleet HMD programs and eBay-style electronic reputation
tracking-to a much larger arena. Nevertheless, we can conceptualize
this Article's proposal as a new paradigm for the enforcement of soci-
etal rules: In public spaces where social norms are reasonably well-
developed and universal, and where policing by government agents is
of a one car, one vote system) to rank for the purposes of determining how many votes
each driver is allotted, and adjusted scores thereafter.
226 For example, I will not consider whether cumulative feedback scores should be vis-
ible on the exterior of vehicles (a point about which I am agnostic); whether HMDFE
should replace voluntary feedback with a market regime, whereby motorists would obtain
financial bonuses for providing negative feedback about a motorist who was subsequently
involved in an accident or for providing positive feedback about a motorist who main-
tained a clean driving record during the next year (a variation that could improve accuracy
but that I would still regard as undesirable on balance); or whether citizens ought to be
able to go "double or nothing" when negative feedback about them is logged, permitting
them to avoid penalties for negative feedback if they receive no similar negative feedback
during the next year or two, but applying a multiplier to the fine if they receive similar
feedback in the near future (a variation that seems appealing). Nor will I address the many
mundane implementation and transitional issues that would inevitably arise, such as the
questions of how older vehicles might be retrofitted with advanced HMDFE technologies,
or issues concerning how, exactly, driver-created positive and negative feedback would be
converted into monetary fines and rewards.
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inherently problematic, we can rely heavily on citizens themselves to
police misconduct.
As suggested earlier,227 work by social norms scholars has postu-
lated that efficient citizen enforcement can occur naturally in close-
knit groups, where repeat player interactions are common, informa-
tion pertinent to social control flows easily, and relations among
actors are somewhat multiplex and not too hierarchical. 228 But in
environments where those conditions do not hold (i.e., among loose-
knit groups) social order sometimes breaks down, necessitating a sub-
stantial police presence. The idea behind this Article is to use tech-
nology to transform loose-knit environments into close-knit
environments, so that the police presence can be curtailed substan-
tially without compromising safety. These schemes therefore replace
state policing with citizen policing, laws with norms, and, to some
extent, rules with standards. In thinking about extensions of the
approach, then, it makes sense to think about other loose-knit envi-
ronments where social disorder sometimes occurs.
There certainly will be social settings in which technologically-
aided norm enforcement is undesirable. I am thinking, in particular,
of those settings in which conformity is bad and majoritarian norms
are invasive. For example, we would recoil at the thought of "How's
My Speech?" being used to sanction political dissidents. When polit-
ical dissent is at issue, society has long recognized the value in letting
unpopular or unfashionable arguments be voiced. More broadly,
majoritarian sentiment may be too quick to condemn intellectual,
political, or artistic innovation. As a result, insecure geniuses whose
ideas might have ultimately prevailed if protected by anonymity will
be too discouraged by the high costs of nonconformism. For that
reason, using "How's My Art?" to award, say, National Endowment
for the Arts grants could inappropriately reward those artists whose
work is not artistically excellent but coincides with the aesthetic pref-
erences of the median voter. Similarly, majoritarian norms may
unduly reflect stubborn biases, like racial, gender, or religious animus,
and society should resist relying heavily on "How's My Driving?" for
Everything approaches in these settings.
In a different vein, we must recognize the problems that would
arise if we applied a "How's My Driving?" approach to matters about
which preferences are very idiosyncratic. For example, such technolo-
gies could take some of the risk out of blind dates,229 but romantic
227 See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
228 ELLICKSON, supra note 101, at 180-82.
229 "How's My Kissing?"
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tastes are certainly variable enough to warrant skepticism about the
approach, and hurt feelings may prompt people to leave inaccurate
feedback following instances of unreciprocated attraction. 230 Indeed,
when the very high emotional stakes associated with dating are com-
bined with highly individualized preferences, the false feedback
problem becomes quite daunting. In other settings, there is simply no
consensus about what the existing social norms are. Here, feedback
will be noisy and unhelpful, at least until preferences crystallize and
converge.
There will be other settings in which conformity is relatively
uncontroversial and median voter instincts are sensible, but where the
costs of using HMD technologies to police misconduct exceed the
benefits. Take pedestrian activity in public spaces. Interactions
among pedestrians on a sidewalk, at a block party, or outside a con-
cert venue are usually reasonably orderly for a variety of reasons:
People interact with others face-to-face, people may be accompanied
by a few acquaintances amidst the crowd, people may fear police
intervention or mob justice if they act boorishly, and many people
have internalized norms that cause them to behave in a considerate
fashion. In a science fiction world, we can imagine a nongovern-
mental "How's My Walking?" system that eliminates anonymity in
public spaces. 231 Were we to hand people remote controls and let
them play a reputational version of laser tag, where their point totals
would be posted on the Internet for employers, parents, blind dates,
and parole officers to see, public misconduct would be deterred sub-
stantially. This regime would be one in which obscurity in public
spaces disappeared entirely, but at what cost?
It may well be that in many "How's My Walking?" settings,
people would resent the disappearance of practical anonymity in
public spaces. Many people take such obscurity for granted, but its
loss is something new celebrities frequently bemoan. Obscurity in
public permits adolescents and adults to experiment with their identi-
230 See Anna Jane Grossman, Honestly Online: Internet Dating Becomes Less of a Crap-
shoot When You Can Pre-Screen Your Potential Date, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 32
(describing some Internet dating sites that incorporate reviews).
231 This is no longer science fiction. Science nonfiction is more like it. As you read
these words, engineers are developing wearable computers that will facilitate face-to-face
interactions when proximate strangers' devices reveal mutual interests, acquaintances, or
social aspirations. Scholars have already begun thinking about how these "wearable com-
munities" can incorporate reputation and feedback. The end result would be an offline
combination of eBay's feedback scores with MySpace.com's social networking capabilities.
See Gerd Kortuem & Zary Segall, Wearable Communities: Augmenting Social Networks
with Wearable Computers, IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Jan.-Mar. 2003, at 71, 77;
Schneider et al., supra note 146, at 245-47.
Reprinted with Permission of New York University School of Law
November 20061
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ties in a way that enables them to discover who they are and what they
enjoy doing.232 It also allows people to forego having to look and act
their best, and to avoid the tension associated with constantly being
judged and rated by their peers. When people are operating poten-
tially deadly motor vehicles, this loss of obscurity seems justified, but
if individuals are just walking to the corner store for a gallon of milk
or sipping a cup of coffee at Starbucks, an omnipresent regime of
anonymous feedback might begin to resemble a prison. In short, gov-
ernment efforts to encourage a "How's My Walking?" regime only
seem appropriate in those environments where public misconduct has
reached crisis levels. We might even imagine situations in which it
would be appropriate for the government to prevent a privately run
"How's My Walking?" regime from coming into existence, based on
some of the concerns identified above.
In looking for successful applications for the "How's My
Driving?" approach, then, we should seek out contexts in which con-
formity is unproblematic, median voter judgments are informative, a
broad social consensus exists regarding appropriate behavior, and the
benefits of reputation tracking exceed the costs. We are, in short,
looking for environments in which the prevalent social norms are uni-
versal and efficient.
For illustrative purposes, we can begin with a context where ano-
nymity is not particularly problematic, but where implementing a rep-
utation-tracking system would be easy enough that an intervention is
plausibly worthwhile. The vast majority of hotel guests are perfectly
cooperative, desiring little more than a clean room and a good night's
sleep. But most readers probably have had the misfortune to be
assigned a room adjacent to an inconsiderate outlier. Many people,
being essentially nonconfrontational, simply endure the noise. Others
bang on walls or ask the front desk employees to intervene, some-
times with minimal success. The problem, of course, is that hotels
cannot identify the noisy patrons in advance, and customers are given
no opportunities to choose their neighbors. It would be easy to
imagine a straightforward "How's My Neighboring?" program for
hotel guests, which would enable hotels to exclude the noisy (or con-
fine them to a particularly well-insulated portion of the hotel) and
allow everyone else to enjoy a decent night's sleep. The idea is to
make reputations for noisiness transportable across hotels. 233
232 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425-28 (2000).
233 This approach might work in other parts of the hotel, too. For example, the hotel
bartender might learn that the patron approaching the bar has just been ejected from
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Other, relatively uncontroversial, extensions of the approach
would include creating multijurisdictional feedback platforms for ven-
dors at flea markets or farmers' markets, or the "ticket scalpers" who
stand outside sports stadiums. Indeed, these kinds of programs might
be useful inside stadiums as well. Shortly before this Article went to
press, the Cincinnati Bengals football team announced the launch of
"513-381-JERK," a telephone number that spectators could call to
report unruly fan behavior.234 Security officials could use the sta-
dium's thirty-eight video cameras to conduct surveillance of spectators
whose misconduct was reported to the hotline, removing or even
arresting fans whose behavior crossed the line.2 35 Given the problems
associated with soccer hooliganism around the globe, the innovation
deserves serious attention.
More controversially, we can imagine the application of HMDFE
variations to public policy issues large (facilitating the accurate
reporting of parental abuse and neglect of their children) and small
(permitting the sanctioning of neighbors who leave their trash cans at
the curbside for too long after pickup day). Without exploring all
these variations, we should turn our attention to three settings in
which these reputation systems seem particularly promising.
The first is military operations. Increasingly, members of the mil-
itary are called upon to engage in peacekeeping operations where
aggravating the local population is detrimental to mission objectives.
Law-abiding Iraqis are constantly witnessing some American soldiers
behaving well and a few behaving quite badly. Yet there is no system-
atic effort to harness this information in a way that might improve
military training and conduct. Now, there is an obvious challenge
here. We do not want insurgents rating GIs, because they will prob-
ably phone in complaints about the most competent soldiers. But if
the peaceful population sufficiently outnumbers the insurgent popula-
tion, and if reporting is made easy enough, this problem can be solved.
And creating such a visible form of accountability may well create
extraordinary goodwill among the occupied.
The same arguments hold true in the context of police officers;
therefore, "How's My Policing?" programs might be promising.2 36
another bar for accosting other patrons, or that a conventioneer routinely becomes violent
when he has had one too many drinks.
234 Barrett J. Brunsman, Bengals Get Tough on Boorish Fans, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Aug. 8, 2006, at Al.
235 Id.
236 See Terence C. Gill, Note, Regulating the Police in Investigatory Stops: A Practical
Alternative to Bright Line Rules, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 200 (1985) (mentioning similar
regime).
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Again, we do not want criminals rating the police, but if we could
encourage law-abiding citizens to lodge compliments or complaints
about particular officers, the benefits would be substantial. Opportu-
nities to report misconduct exist in the present system: A citizen can
jot down a badge number and call a precinct or write a letter to a
police commissioner. Some jurisdictions, like New York City, have
developed Civilian Complaint Review Boards (CCRBs) that investi-
gate each such complaint and take action where appropriate. 237 These
institutions are useful, but the costs of using these formal channels are
rather high. A complaining citizen often must be interviewed and
divulge his or her identity to the officer in question. Cities that are
interested in genuine officer accountability might consider supple-
menting CCRBs with "How's My Policing?" programs that generate
more citizen feedback but ascribe far less significance to any partic-
ular piece of feedback. With "How's My Policing?" programs, police
supervisors would be looking for trends in the feedback data, rather
than waiting for one aggrieved citizen to spend significant time and
energy establishing the veracity of an officer misconduct claim.
There is a third type of environment in which reputation-tracking
and feedback systems may be particularly advantageous; it is an envi-
ronment that is hard to describe, however, because it does not yet
exist. As discussed above, "How's My Driving?" for Everything may
prove successful when a well-developed set of norms already exists.
But recall the preceding discussion of how HMD programs might also
permit us to create a "traffic code" that can be updated to reflect real-
time changes in drivers' preferences and behaviors.238
On this model, we can use "How's My Driving?" for Everything
to create hyperdemocratic rules in new environments characterized by
loose-knit interactions. Surveying the past decade or so, scores of new
environments like this have sprouted up, mostly in cyberspace:
Internet chat rooms, online poker tournaments, peer-to-peer file
swapping networks, massive multiuser online games, craigslist.org,
"comments" sections on blogs, and many more. The designers of
these new environments often have to guess about what types of rules
to impose on their users, and mistakes will be inevitable.
Technologies that allow anonymous users to rate each other's
behavior and explain the basis for their high or low ratings will often
be a highly beneficial means of giving users the types of rules they
want and galvanizing user opinion around desirable innovations.
237 For a description of the results obtained in New York, see New York City Civilian
Complaint Review Board, CCRB Performance, http://www.nyc.gov/htmi/ccrb/html/
about.html (last visited June 15, 2006).
238 See supra text accompanying note 223.
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Nobody knows what new loose-knit environments will emerge in the
coming decades. But we have enough information to suspect that in
the new environments that do emerge, "How's My Driving?" for
Everything stands poised to help create and enforce the norms that
will regulate behavior therein.
CONCLUSION
The regime advanced in this Article represents a rethinking of the
way that we currently regulate traffic. Anonymous driving results in
aggressive and unsafe behavior that kills thousands of Americans each
year and makes tens of millions of commuters miserable. Although
anonymous driving has become a fundamental fact of urban, sub-
urban, and exurban driving environments, this anonymity can be cur-
tailed. Indeed, in many ways, driver anonymity seems like a relic from
a bygone era, out of place in the information age. Just as eBay's repu-
tation-tracking system tamed e-commerce fraud rather effectively,
"How's My Driving?" for Everyone might rein in aggressive, inconsid-
erate, and unsafe driving.
"How's My Driving?" programs appear to improve commercial
fleet accident rates substantially, although more research on this front
is certainly warranted. Assuming that further study confirms the very
promising initial industry data, the state should strongly consider
extending these programs to passenger vehicles, and there are strong
reasons to favor mandatory participation within a given jurisdiction.
At any given moment, there are millions of American drivers
who are watching their fellow motorists behave badly. Many of these
drivers mutter to themselves about their peers' misconduct, growing
increasingly frustrated with their driving experience. At times, this
frustration boils over into extreme acts of road rage. These opinions
are formed, the information exists, and it is being vocalized to passen-
gers or to no one in particular.
All the government needs to do is harness this information. In so
doing, the government would be delegating substantial traffic regula-
tion duties to its drivers, in one fell swoop eliminating the need for
vast numbers of traffic police, enabling insurers to price automobile
premiums in a more individualized, less discriminatory manner, and,
quite possibly, making urban driving fun again.
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